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I. INTRODUCTION
Most Cuba scholars and Cuba watchers generally agree that
the near future will bring the fall of Fidel Castro and the forma-
tion of a new Cuban polity whose contours are unknown. It is
unlikely that a post-Castro Cuba will experience the same rela-
tively peaceful transformation from a communist-controlled,
centrally-planned economy to a market economy as witnessed in
other newly-elected democratic nations of the world.' For such a
transformation to occur, planners must give serious forethought
to the building of new institutions with sufficient popular le-
gitimacy to replace the discredited institutions of the communist
regime. The construction of new institutions will be perhaps the
most vexing challenge in the housing context, an area which
deeply concerns and divides Cuban nationals and exiles.2 The
formation of new housing institutions, whether new or borrowed
from successful application elsewhere, will require a consensus
between interested parties regarding the desired goals of proper-
ty reform. One of the primary goals will undoubtedly involve the
marketization through privatization of a large percentage of the
housing stock. This task will prove to be extremely divisive and
enormously complex. In order to begin the task and remain
1. See Enrique A. Baloyra, Where Does Cuba Stand?, in CUBA AND THE FU-
TURE 23, 36-38 (Donald E. Schulz ed., 1994).
2. This Article refers to Cuban citizens presently living on the island of Cuba
as "Cuban nationals" or "nationals." Former residents of Cuba who were citizens at
the time they left Cuba and now reside elsewhere are referred to as "Cuban exiles"
or "exiles." When speaking of both groups in the abstract, the term "Cubans" is
used.
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focused on its long-term goals, Cubans must clearly understand
why they are privatizing in the first place.
A. Why Privatize?
The primary goal articulated for the privatization of state-
owned assets in the transformation of a socialist economy is to
increase the nation's long-term economic efficiency. 4 It is argued
that placing capital and planning decisions in private hands will
decentralize decision-making and unleash market forces, allow-
ing the proper allocation of resources and eventually bringing
long term health and stability to the economy.' It is clear, how-
ever, that initially, privatization has the opposite effect: econo-
mies in transition shrink.6 This occurs because, as market forc-
es are unleashed on the economy for the first time, the produc-
tion of excess supply is curtailed and the need for input, particu-
larly labor, is scaled back.7 It is not entirely clear, however, that
privatization of all state-owned assets is required or even pre-
ferred, as there do exist numerous profitable state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) throughout the world.'
The second most commonly articulated goal of privatization
is the equitable redistribution of property rights. Because prop-
erty and power were concentrated in the hands of a small elite
under socialism, the nomenklatura, it is argued that privatiza-
tion will enable the new regime to break the stranglehold of the
3. This Article does not consider the privatization of state-owned assets in a
developed market economy, which is a phenomenon quite different from the privat-
ization of state-owned assets in the transformation from a command to a market
economy, especially where accompanied by a change from non-democratic to demo-
cratic governance. See David Lipton & Jeffrey Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Eu-
rope: The Case of Poland, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTMTY 231
(1990).
4. See Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions in
Large Scale Privatizations 3, 3-7 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Center for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia University School of Law) [here-
inafter Large Scale Privatizations].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. The Korean steel industry has been noted for efficient management. See In-
ternational Steel Industry Costly Status Symbols, LONDON TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991, at
4. For a discussion of the fundamentals of privatization theory, see David
Sappington & Joseph Stiglitz, Privatization, Information and Incentives, 6 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 567, 567-82 (1987).
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nomenklatura and redistribute property rights across a broader
spectrum of the population. Unfortunately, the experiences in
Eastern Europe have shown that privatization often has a mini-
mal redistributive impact.9
In the transformation of a socialist economic and political
structure, a wide-scale policy of privatization marks a new re-
gime as decidedly different from the discredited old regime. It is
therefore not surprising that one commentator, in her compara-
tive study of privatization politics in Eastern Europe, concluded
that privatization is less an economic choice than an ideological
choice of political succession.'0 Thus, when pursued within the
parameters of developing a market economy, the privatization of
any particular group of state assets should be understood not
only in terms of long-term economic growth but, more impor-
tantly, in terms of the symbolic intent of the new regime.
B. Cuba and the Experience of Post-Socialist Societies in
Transformation
The transformation of Cuba's command economy presents
many of the classic problems faced in the transformation of
former socialist economies. Economies in transition share a
background of general problems that must be considered in any
privatization or marketization scheme," such as problems of
equity in distributing national assets among competing interests
and the valuation of assets where there is no functioning market
in place.
The primary economic obstacle in designing a privatization
scheme is the absence of an existing market for goods and ser-
vices, which makes it impossible to accurately value state-held
property. 2 This places a difficult burden on the state authority
in charge of privatizing to establish terms of sale that are at-
tractive to investors without making the authority liable to
charges that it undervalued the national patrimony and sold too
9. Anna Gelpern, The Laws and Politics of Reprivatization in East-Central
Europe: A Comparison, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 315, 358 (1993).
10. Id.
11. Because this background has been well-documented in the legal, sociological
and economic literature, it need only be outlined here.
12. See Large Scale Privatizations, supra note 4, at 11-15.
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cheaply."3 Additionally, the restructuring of enterprises has
lead to mass unemployment and social dislocation in almost
every instance where it has occurred, resulting in considerable
political instability that further inhibits economic growth. 14
Perhaps the single most disturbing question for lawyers
contemplating property reform has been to determine who is the
rightful owner?5 The question is not purely academic because
the lack of clear property rights impedes economic development
by discouraging investment and demoralizing the populace. The
case of Nicaragua is particularly instructive for Cuba. In Nicara-
gua, the socialist Sandinista regime had appropriated approxi-
mately thirty-six percent of the total land of the country in its
agricultural reform program. 6 After the Sandinistas lost pow-
er, unclear ownership rights encouraged land invasions and
violent confrontations, which law enforcement agencies were
either unwilling or unable to prevent. 7 Some commentators
conclude that the uncertainty of property rights and the violence
resulting from attempts to establish those rights are the most
important factors inhibiting economic recovery in Nicaragua."
The case of Nicaragua makes the point that a privatization
scheme should not go forward until the ownership of property
between the state, current occupants, and preconfiscation own-
ers is resolved. In doing so, privatization scheme must be careful
not to further entrench the privileges gained by the nomen-
klatura in the previous regime. Due to the fear that the
nomenklatura will spontaneously privatize to itself state assets
under its control, it is generally believed that the new regime
must act quickly to divest the nomenklatura of state assets.
C. Multiplicity of Mechanisms and Speeds of Privatization
Privatization has been accomplished primarily through five
different mechanisms for the transfer of property, employed
13. Id. at 17.
14. See id. at 8.
15. See Oleg T. Bogomolov, Who Will Own Nobody's Property? (Nov. 25, 1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
16. Rolando H. Castafieda & George Plinio Montalvin, Economic Factors in
Selecting an Approach to Expropriations Claims in Cuba 9 (Jan. 26, 1995) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the author).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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alone or in conjunction with one or more of the other
mechanisms. 9 The dominant mechanisms have been: (i) the
voucher, where coupons representing an interest in a pool of
state assets are freely transferred, or sold at nominal cost, to
each citizen to be invested either directly in state property or in
approved mutual funds; (ii) a sale to citizens, in which citizens
winning an auction of state assets pay the state directly for
ownership of those assets; (iii) a sale to investors, where typically
foreign or expatriate investors winning an auction or negotiating
directly with the state property authority pay the state directly
for the ownership of state assets; (iv) worker/ manager privatiza-
tion, where, pursuant to adopted policy, the state allows the
managers and workers in control of state property to formally
take possession of the property; and (v) spontaneous privatiza-
tion, where the persons in control of state assets, usually the
management, workers or members of the bureaucracy, appropri-
ate and often liquidate the assets. The fear of spontaneous pri-
vatization oftentimes requires the state to exert control over
state assets immediately in an attempt to effect a disposition of
the assets in a manner that benefits the citizens as a whole.
Privatization programs are also characterized by the speed
with which they aim to divest the state of the means of produc-
tion. Poland followed a "shock" privatization program, which
tried to create a market economy through the immediate privat-
ization of state assets without the prior construction of market
institutional infrastructure.20 At the other extreme, Hungary,
already having the tradition of a mixed economy under social-
ism, implemented a more gradual privatization program.2 Re-
gardless of the desired speed of privatization, even the best-
planned, most rapid attempt at privatization (e.g., the "shock"
privatization in Poland) takes years to accomplish due to the
backlog of state-owned assets.22
19. An excellent analysis of the dominant privatization mechanisms employed in
Central and Eastern Europe is contained in Paul Hare, Privatization in Comparative
Perspective: An Overview of the Emerging Issues, in PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE 31, 34-38 (Saul Estrin ed., 1994).
20. See Marek Mazur et al., Privatization in Poland, in PRIVATIZATION AND
ECONOMIC REFORM IN CENTRAL EUROPE 175, 175-208 (Dennis Rondinelli ed., 1994).
21. See IKAlman Mizsei et al., Experiences with Privatization in Hungary: The
Early Transition Period, in PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CENTRAL EU-
ROPE 41, 41-68 (Dennis Rondinelli ed., 1994).
22. See Large Scale Privatizations, supra note 4, at 16.
459
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The events in Eastern Europe indicate that a "shock" privat-
ization exacerbates the dislocations inherent in the transforma-
tion process.23 Much of Eastern Europe remains on the brink of
instability. In both Poland and Hungary, the former communists
triumphed at the polls, vowing to slow the privatization pro-
cess.24 In Russia, to appease embittered nationalist sentiment,
the government waged a brutal and expensive campaign against
the rebelling Chechens, driving the budget deficit higher and
risking the loss of critical IMF assistance.25 A transformation
program that is not seen as equitable or that does not ac-
knowledge the tradition and culture of the country, including the
socialist period, will be subject to retrenchment.26 As evidenced
in Eastern Europe, massive social and economic dislocation
resulted at the initial transformation because the means of pro-
duction were privatized before a market existed and without an
established regime of private property, a stable fiscal or mone-
tary medium, and financial or investment instruments.27 There-
fore, as one of the most prominent exile scholars on the Cuban
economy has concluded, because a rapid privatization creates
political and social risks for which the administrative, economic,
human, and moral resources do not yet exist,28 a "gradualist"
approach to privatization is the only feasible solution as it al-
lows the development of a market economy that incorporates the
socio-cultural and socio-psychological order of the country.29
This Article proposes the creation of a new form of property,
the limited equity housing corporation, as the primary vehicle
for the transformation of residential property from state owner-
ship to private ownership in a reforming or post-socialist Cuba.
The Article argues that hybrid forms of property, which are
23. See Vladimir Kollontai, Social Aspects of Economic Reform in Russia (Nov.
25, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
24. Paul Lewis, World Markets: A Headlong Crawl Toward Capitalism, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at 13.
25. Id.
26. David Stark, Path Dependency and Privatization Strategies in East-Central
Europe, 6 EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETIES 11, 35-38 (1992).
27. Antonio Jorge, Small, Developing Economies in Transition: Prospects for
Post-Castro Cuba, in CUBA'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM THE FORMER
SOVIET BLOC 92, 98-99 (Adolfo Leyva ed., 1992).
28. Id. at 95.
29. Id. at 92-103. By "gradualist" approach, Jorge means the gradual implemen-
tation of a full transformation, not the half-way implementation or partial transfor-
mation of a former socialist economy. Id. at 95.
460 [Vol. 27:3
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familiar and continue to thrive in the capitalist west, can, by
their voluntary nature, form the bridge between the state con-
trol of property and the private control of property. Part I looks
primarily to the experience of Eastern Europe in examining the
motives behind privatization and the various types and speeds of
privatization applied to date. In seeking to root the new form of
property in contemporary Cuba, Parts II and III explore the
unique situation of Cuba among reforming post-socialist nations
and the role of property under the socialist property regime,
respectively. Part IV discusses the issue of restitution, arguing
against providing restitution to former property owners and
favoring instead a compensation scheme that encourages former
owners to invest in the badly deteriorated housing stock to aid
in the reconstruction of Cuba. Part V examines the range of
successful market institutions created by law and the goals of a
property rights regime in an economy in transition in arguing
for a hybrid solution crafted particularly for Cuba. Part VI out-
lines the limited equity housing corporation.
II. THE CUBAN CONTEXT
A. Political and Economic Conditions in Cuba
Cuba is in a unique position vis-A-vis other post-socialist
countries.3' Because an independent civil society does not exist
in contemporary Cuba, there is an almost complete absence of
political dissent.31 Thus, dissident organizations with broad
popular appeal, such as the Solidarity labor union and the Cath-
olic church in Poland, the Protestant church in East Germany or
Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, do not exist in Cuba.32 Due to
the limited access to information in contemporary Cuba, the
future has become the major preoccupation of the Cuban peo-
ple."3 The government has sought to prevent this preoccupation
from taking the form of dissent through constant surveillance
and constant activity, such as the reported requiring of the
construction of emergency bomb shelters under the streets of
Havana.'
30. Baloyra, supra note 1, at 23-24.
31. Id. at 24-26.
32. Id. at 26.
33. Id. at 27.
34. Donald E. Schulz, Can Castro Survive?, J. INTER-AM. STUD. & WoRLD AFF.
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Overall, the average Cuban national, citing the health and
education achievements of the Revolution, remains surprisingly
loyal to the Revolution." This is especially true because the
Castro regime is strongly identified with safeguarding the na-
tional identity, a position which has only been reinforced by the
U.S. embargo.36
Cuba, unlike other post-socialist nations whose transforma-
tion has been extensively studied, is a third world nation, a
factor whose effect on the transformation process is unknown. Of
the post-socialist countries of the former Soviet bloc, only
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have the same level of gross domestic
product (GDP) as Cuba. 7 Even though the United Nations Hu-
man Development Index (HDI) ranks Cuba as having a medium
level of human development, considerably higher than the Do-
minican Republic, Nicaragua or Haiti,38 the real GDP of Cuba,
only $2000 per year, is actually somewhere between Haiti and
Nicaragua.39 In 1958, Cuba ranked third in Latin America, be-
89, 98 (1993).
35. Id.
36. Id. The United States initiated the embargo against Cuba with the export
and import controls instituted against the island in 1962 under the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1961. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (1982). In 1962, Congress enacted a com-
prehensive set of regulations governing trade with Cuba, the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations (CACR), which are administered by the Treasury Department. 31 C.F.R.
§ 515 (1993). The CACR were issued under authority of § 5(b) of the Trading With
The Enemy Act of 1917. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1988). The embargo was
strengthened by the Cuban Democracy Act, signed by President George Bush in
October 1992, the so-called Torricelli Bill. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (Supp. IV 1988).
The Cuban Democracy Act prohibits the foreign subsidiaries of American companies
from trading with Cuba (the Mack Amendment) and empowers the President to
impose sanctions on nations granting aid to Cuba. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001(8), 6005(a)(1)
(Supp. IV 1988). The embargo was further strengthened by the Cuban Liberty and
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, the so-called Helms-Burton Legislation
[hereinafter Helms-Burton Legislation]. Act of March 12, 1996, P.L. 104-114, §§ 1-5,
101-16, 201-07, 301-06, 401 (codified at 22 U.S.C.S. §§ 6021-24, 6031-46, 6061-67,
6081-85, 6091 (1996)). The Helms-Burton Legislation provides that, among other
things, U.S. nationals, including persons who at the time of the seizure of their
property were Cuban nationals, can file claims in U.S. federal court against persons
"trafficking" in (which is effectively defined as deriving any economic benefit from)
such seized property. See id. at §§ 4, 103, 301-06.
37. United Nations Development Program, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 129-
31 (1994) (hereinafter HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT] (All UNDP GDP statistics are
given in Purchasing Power Parity terms using 1991 statistics). Compare the GDP of
Cuba ($2000) with Uzbekistan ($2790) and Tajikistan ($2180). Id.
38. Id. at 129-31, 223. Compare Cuba's HDI ranking (89th) with that of the
Dominican Republic (96th), Nicaragua (106th) and Haiti (137th). Id. at 129-31.
39. Id. at 129-31. Compare the GDP of Cuba ($2000) with the Dominican Re-
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hind only Argentina and Venezuela, in GNP.' Today, Cuba
ranks in the bottom quintile of GNP in Latin America."
As the economic assistance from the former Soviet bloc, on
whom Cuba was almost exclusively economically dependent, was
withdrawn, the Cuban economy entered a tailspin.42 During
this period of radical readjustment, the government, starting in
1990, developed a strategy referred to as the Special Period in a
Time of Peace.' This strategy aims to deploy workers from the
cities to the countryside to assist in agricultural production, re-
duce the consumption of oil and other imported products
through more stringent rationing and control the misappropria-
tion of government goods for sale on the black market." Cuba
also began a massive deindustrialization, which has been com-
pared to the anti-industrialization policy implemented by Pol Pot
in the former Kampuchea.' These macroeconomic changes
have directly impacted the quality of life for the average Cuban;
by mid-1993, many Cubans were reduced to eating only one and
a half to two meals daily, resulting in serious health prob-
lems." With the cut-off of Soviet oil, automobiles were jetti-
soned in favor of bicycles, tractors in favor of ox-drawn plows.
47
As the basic level of infrastructure deteriorated, Cuban nation-
als were asked to leave their manufacturing and office jobs to
public ($3080), Nicaragua ($2550) and Haiti ($925). Id.
40. See CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION, Cuba: Past, Present and Fu-
ture, in CUBA'S TRANSITION 144, 153 (1992) [hereinafter Cuba: Past, Present and
Future].
41. Id. Compare the 1991 GNP figures for Cuba ($2000), Argentina ($5120) and
Venezuela ($8120). HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 37, at 129-31.
42. Andrew Zimbalist, Treading Water: Cuba's Economic and Political Crisis, in
CUBA AND THE FUTURE 7, 7-11. (Donald E. Schulz ed., 1994).
43. Id. at 11. Other aspects of the strategy include trying to attract foreign
investment and facilitating selective structural economic reforms. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Jaime Suchlicki & Antonio Jorge, Introduction, in INVESTING IN CUBA:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS vii (Jaime Suchlicki & Antonio Jorge eds., 1994). The
situation is so critical that the Castro regime quietly began the sale of European
masterpieces from the Cuban Museum of Art on the international art market to
earn hard currency. See Pamela S. Falk, Cuba's Power Structure at the Crossroads,
in CUBA'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET BLOC 19,
23 (Adolfo Leyva ed., 1992).
46. GILLIAN GUNN, CUBA IN TRANSITION: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 29 (1993)
[hereinafter GUNN, CUBA IN TRANSITION] (citing Kathleen Barrett, The Effect of the
Collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc on the Cuban Health Care System
(May 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file at Georgetown University)).
47. Id. at 30.
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"volunteer" in the fields." Cuba currently finds itself at an im-
passe.
B. Inequality of Bargaining Power Between Cuban Exiles
and Cuban Nationals
The transformation in Cuba presents problems of a different
order than those faced in the transformation of Eastern Europe-
an economies. This is due not only to unique features of the
political and economic context within Cuba, but also, or even
primarily, to unique features of the Cuban exile community. In
the current Cuban situation, exiles who fled the island after
Castro's assumption of power in 1959 stand in a position of
strength and bargaining power vis-a-vis the Cubans who have
remained in the country. This occurrence is without parallel in
the Eastern European context.
The demographic realities of the Cuban exiles are markedly
different from Czech, Polish or any other Eastern European
exiles. Unlike Eastern Europe, an unprecedented percentage of
Cubans, at least ten percent, left their homeland as political or
economic exiles.4 Unlike other exile communities that suffered
from diaspora, the Cuban exile community has remained com-
paratively intact, concentrated primarily in one country in only
two geographic regions, greater Miami and New Jersey.0 Many
in the community remain focused on events in Cuba."' Most
exiles are virulently anti-Castro: a full two-thirds of exiles favor
a policy of "confrontation" with the Castro regime. 2 This con-
centration, plus the fact that the Cuban-American community
has assimilated less than many other previously mentioned exile
groups, has led to a development of political power, sophistica-
tion, and influence unknown in the Eastern European con-
text.53 The muscle of the Cuban exile community in dictating
48. See DEBRA EVENSON, REVOLUTION IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND SOCIETY IN
CONTEMPORARY CUBA 190 (1994).
49. HIMILCE ESTEVE, EL EXILIO CUBANo EN PUERTO Rico [THE CUBAN EXILE
IN PUERTO Rico] 13-14 (1984). Esteve estimates that by the end of 1961, 10% of the
population of Cuba had fled. Id. The percentage is undoubtedly higher today, as
there have been several additional, although smaller, waves of emigration. Id.
50. Mark Falcoff, Cuba and the United States: Thinking about the Future, in
CUBA AND THE FUTURE 117, 122 (Donald E. Schulz ed., 1994).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 120 n.4.
53. Gunn discusses the strong links between the Cuban exile community, par-
[Vol. 27:3464
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that the United States maintain a policy of hostility toward
Cuba is well-documented.5 In contrast to West Germany,
which pursued its Ostpolitik of appeasement of the communist
regime over the heads of embittered German exiles to the
end,"5 the Cuban exile community in the United States contin-
ues to prevent any rapprochement. 6 In fact, any member of the
exile community suspected of attempting to establish relations
with the Castro regime is ostracized and intimidated in a most
public manner.5 7
Not surprisingly, there are profound demographic differenc-
es between the exile community and Cuban nationals. Cuban
exiles are not only often affluent in an absolute sense, they are,
more importantly, exponentially wealthy relative to their former
countrymen. The exile community is overwhelmingly white and
represented the professional class in pre-Castro Cuba.5" Cuban
nationals are predominately of African or mixed ancestry.59 The
sharp racial divide is a constant source of often unstated ten-
sion." Furthermore, there is a profound psychological divide
ticularly the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), and the Bush admin-
istration and the subsequent acquiescence of the Clinton administration to hard-line
policies. See Gillian Gunn, In Search of a Modern Cuba Policy, in CUBA AND THE
FUTURE 127, 129-131 (Donald E. Schulz ed., 1994) [hereinafter Gunn, Modern Cuba
Policy].
54. Id. at 131-33. The Torricelli Bill and Helms-Burton Legislation are potent
examples of the strength of the Cuban exile lobby in dictating United States foreign
policy toward Cuba.
55. See Thomas F. O'Boyle, Europe: Ostpolitic's Pull on the German Psyche,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1987, at 33; Thomas F. O'Boyle, Soviets, Germans Warming
to Each Other as Ostpolitic Comes Out of a Deep Freeze, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1988,
at 24.
56. See Christopher Marquis, Republicans Put Cuba on Front Burner, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 6, 1995, at A6; Paul Anderson & Don Bohning, White House Denies
Change in Cuba Policy, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 8, 1995, at As.
57. See Gunn, Modern Cuba Policy, supra note 53, at 134-35. The orthodoxy re-
quired by the Cuban exile community is well-illustrated by the case of Mario Baeza.
Id. President Clinton had considered naming Baeza, a prominent black Cuban-Ameri-
can partner at the law firm Debevoise & Plimpton in New York, as assistant secre-
tary of state for Inter-American Affairs, until Baeza was ferociously attacked by the
exile community for being "soft" on Cuba. Id. Baeza had affronted the exile commu-
nity by appearing at a Euromoney conference on business opportunities in Cuba and
by voicing public reservations about the Torricelli Bill. Id.
58. Id, at 13-14.
59. Cuba is presently 51% mulatto, 37% white, 11% black and 1% Chinese. See
Cuba: Past, Present and Future, supra note 40, at 145.
60. GUNN, CUBA IN TRANSITION, supra note 46, at 36-37, 44. Gunn notes that
considerable racial hostility was generated by the de-penalization of hard currency
on July 26, 1993. Id. at 36-37. The access to hard currency by nationals with rela-
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between the exile community and Cuban nationals. Many exiles
find it traitorous that Cuban nationals, particularly Afro-Cubans
and the disaffected, remain loyal to the Castro regime.6 ' The
exile community and the nationals remain polarized.
Given the inequality of bargaining power between the exile
community and Cuban nationals, there is considerable possi-
bility that, upon a change in government in Cuba, the exile
community will be in the position to shape the transformation
agenda in a manner that best represents its interests. It is quite
conceivable that the interests of Cuban nationals will be subor-
dinated to the interests of their wealthier cousins to the point
that Cubans nationals are dispossessed of their share of the
national patrimony.
C. Visions for the Transformation of Cuba Proposed by the
Cuban Exile Community
In anticipation of the perceived imminent demise of the
Castro regime, many in the Cuban-American exile community
have already begun to develop plans for the reclamation of their
former property in Cuba.62 In 1990, the "Registry of Expropriat-
ed Properties in Cuba" was established by the Research Insti-
tute for Cuban Studies at the University of Miami and the Dade
County Commissioners to enable former owners to register their
claims.63 In 1992, advertisements appeared in Miami papers
inviting Cuban exiles to make claims through such newly-found-
ed private organizations as the "Cuban Claims Bureau."" In
the popular Spanish-language press in Miami, there is a con-
tinuous flow of articles in which exiles speak longingly and con-
vincingly about returning to their former homes to demand the
restitution of their property as the price of assisting in a post-
tives abroad, who tended to be white, has made them relatively "rich" in comparison
to nationals without relatives abroad, a fact that has generated considerable tension.
Id.
61. Id. at 42-43.
62. See Ram6n A. Mestre, Quin quiere reclamar su propriedad? [Who Wants to
Reclaim Their Property?], EL NUEvO HERALD, Aug. 10, 1990. Juan Manuel Cao, Lo
voy a reclamar en Cuba [I Am Going to Reclaim It in Cuba], EL NUEVO HERALD,
Aug. 1, 1990.
63. ANDRES OPPENHEIMER, CAsTRo's FINAL HoUR 323 (1992).
64. Cuba Pronto Serd Libre [Cuba Will Soon Be Free] EL DIARIO LAS AMER-
ICAS, Jan. 19, 1992, at A9.
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Castro reconstruction of Cuba.65 At the popular level, many, if
not most, exiles believe that they will be able to return to their
former homes.
To complicate matters, the Cuban government has actively
and openly exploited the fears of the Cuban population regard-
ing the security of their property interests if the exiles were to
return.' In an address to the National Assembly that was ra-
dio broadcast, Castro warned the Cuban people that "in Miami,
they are already parceling out our country, and dreaming of
getting everything back, but that won't happen as long as there
remains one single man or woman with a sense of dignity."67
The message of these broadcasts fits in well with the overall
propaganda strategy of the Castro regime, which tells Cubans
that their options are limited to "Castro or Miami."
The more extreme view of former property owners, as out-
lined above, has been openly rejected by many prominent Cuban
exiles, including important members of the Cuban American
National Foundation (CANF).69 CANF clearly stated in its
Transition Program for a Post-Castro Cuba (Transition Outline)
its intention, upon a restoration of democratic rule, "to prohibit
the eviction of any Cuban from his/her home, residence or dwell-
ing and recognize the resident's right of possession as the means
to claim property before the courts."70 Furthermore, the Transi-
65. Vicente Echerri, La poldmica del derecho a la propriedad [The Controversy
of Rights to Property], EL NUEVO HERALD, June 11, 1992; Terratenientes exilados
responden a criticas [Exiled Landowners Respond to Critics], EL NUEVO HERALD,
Oct. 19, 1991; Mario Girbau, Zapatos para mis surcos, EL NUEVO HERALD, Dec. 7,
1991; Fermin Fernindez Luzdrraga, Lo nuestro lo varnos a reclamar! [We're Going to
Reclaim What Is Ours!], EL NUEVO HERALD, Aug. 1, 1992; Josd Manuel Casanova,
El derecho de propriedad [The Right to Property], DiARIO LAS AMERICAS, Dec. 3,
1993; Ariel Remos, La devoluci6n de propriedades industriales es bdsica para la
reconstruccidn de Cuba [The Return of Industrial Property Is Basic to the Recon-
struction of Cuba], DIARiO LAS AMERICAS, July 17, 1994; Rafael Portuondo, Sin
devoluci6n no hay reconstrucci6n [There Is No Reconstruction Without Restitution],
EL NUEVO HERALD, Aug. 24, 1994. A 1992 poll conducted by Channel 23 in Miami
revealed that thirty-three percent of exiles believed that exiles should be able to re-
claim their homes. Id.
66. See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 63, at 324.
67. Fidel Castro, Address to National Assembly, Dec. 27, 1991, reprinted in
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 63, at 324.
68. Rolando Bonachea, Update: Social and Political Crisis in Cuba, in CUBA'S
TRANSITION To DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET BLOC 10 (1992).
69. Mestre, supra note 62.
70. THE CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION, TRANSITION PROGRAM FOR A
POST-CASTRO CUBA: OUTLINE 5 (May 1993) (italics in original) [hereinafter
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tion Outline affirms the "basic principle" that the nationals
"must be the primary beneficiaries of the privatization effort."7'
Nicolas J. Gutidrrez, Jr., representing the Cuban Sugar Mill
Owners Association, specifically excluded residential property
from its list of properties that should be restored when calling
for the "full restitution of all non-materially altered industrial,
commercial and agricultural properties to their legitimate own-
ers.... "72 Julio Romafiach, a Cuban-American attorney active
in Cuban issues, has developed proposed legislation that would
prevent the forced eviction of national occupants by returning
exiles, while simultaneously establishing a claims authority to
rank property claims. 3
The Transition Outline also provides that the confiscation of
all property and goods by the Castro regime without compensa-
tion to their owners was arbitrary and invalid.74 The two provi-
sions seemingly contradict. At best, the intent of the latter provi-
sion may simply be to establish a legal basis for compensation
for former owners under a new legal regime. At worst, the provi-
sion granting a right of possession to current occupants may be
merely a propaganda counter-offensive: a promise that would
not be kept. In any event, it may be difficult for any interim
transition government, no matter how well-intentioned, to pre-
vent well-armed returning exiles from attempting to reclaim
their property if they are so disposed."
TRANSITION OUTLINE].
71. Id. at 4.
72. Nicolas J. Gutinrrez, Jr., The De-Constitutionalization of Property Rights:
Castro's Systematic Assault on Private Ownership in Cuba, Address at the American
Bar Association 1994 Annual Meeting, New Orleans, La., reprinted in 1 LATIN AM.
Bus. LAW ALERT 5, 19 (1994). Gutidrrez seems to have modified his position some-
what; in a survey of Cuban exile organizations conducted by La Sociedad Econ6mica
in December, 1993, Gutidrrez stated that housing should also be subject to claims
from former owners. Poll Results: How Do Cuba's Dissident and Exile Groups Envis-
age Cuba's Economic Future? LA SOCIEDAD ECONOMICA, Bull. 38, at 5 (Dec. 6, 1993).
73. Julio Romafiach, En torno al proyecto de ley de viviendas urbanas y rurales
[Reconsidering the Project of Urban and Rural Housing Law], in CUBA IN TRANSI-
TION, 2ND MEETING OF THE ASSOC. FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECON. 93, 93-94
(1992).
74. TRANSITION OUTLINE, supra note 70, at 4.
75. See discussion of Nicaragua, supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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III. PROPERTY REGIME UNDER CUBAN SOCIALISM
The issue of property reform in Cuba cannot be understood
unless placed in the context of the three distinct historical phas-
es of property relations. The first phase of property relationships
was the system of the latifundia, or landed estate, established
during the Spanish colonial period.'6 The second phase of prop-
erty relations, which commenced when the United States gained
Cuba in the Spanish American War in 1898 and continued
through independence until the socialist revolution, was a capi-
talist phase characterized by a neo-colonial relationship of de-
pendence on American business interests, which dominated the
economic life of the nation and owned the majority of productive
assets." The final phase of property relations, the socialist
phase, sought to overcome the gross inequality and distortions
that characterized the two preceding phases through the nation-
alization of all productive assets and institutionalization of so-
cialist property law.
A. Socialist Property Law
Article 14 of the 1976 Constitution provides that the Cuban
economic system is "based on the socialist ownership of all the
people over the means of production and the elimination of the
exploitation of man by man.""8 In addition to the traditional
76. For a discussion of the latifundia system, see JAMES LOCKHART & STUART
SCHWARTZ, CAMBRIDGE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 46: EARLY LATIN AMERICA: A HIS-
TORY OF COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA AND BRAZIL (1983).
77. For a discussion of the pre-Revolutionary economic and political system in
Cuba, see HUGH THOMAS, CUBA: THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM (1971); PHILIP S. FONER,
A HISTORY OF CUBA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES (1962); Richard
Millett, Imperialism Intervention and Exploitation: Historical Context of International
Relations in the Caribbean, in THE RESTLESS CARIBBEAN: CHANGING PATTERNS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3, 3-18 (Richard Millet & W. Marvin Will eds., 1979).
Castafieda & Montalv~n note that before the Revolution, U.S. investors owned ninety
percent of all electric generating capacity, the entire telephone system and the ma-
jority of the mining industry, as well as between 1.5 and 2 million acres of land.
Castafieda & Montalvdn, supra note 16, at 13.
78. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE 24 DE FEBRERO DE 1976 art. 14 (Cu-
ba) [hereinafter 1976 CONST.] amended by LEY DE REFORMA CONSTITUTIONAL [1992
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM LAW] (July 13, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 CONSTITUTIONAL RE-
FORM LAw].
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forms of state79 and personal property0 under socialist law,
the 1976 Constitution established a new form of property known
as small farmer property.8 State property, which is owned by
"the entire people," is broadly defined as all natural resources
and all basic means of production, including farms, factories,
banks, social and cultural enterprises, as well as any type of
property appropriated from imperialists, large landholders or
members of the bourgeoisie. s2 The second major form of proper-
ty, personal property, is defined as items intended for consump-
tion to satisfy an individual's basic needs, which includes a
household's dwelling unit." However, the land under a dwell-
ing unit would be considered state property because it is a natu-
ral resource.' Only the land owned directly by small farmers
and their cooperatives is not owned by the state." A fourth and
new form of property, the mixed enterprise (empresa mixta), was
established under Law-Decree 50 of 1992 (Law-Decree 50).ss
The mixed enterprise was defined as a commercial joint venture
between a foreign entity and a Cuban state corporate entity.
B. The Housing Sector in Cuba
Urban housing was de-emphasized in revolutionary Cuba on
both the symbolic and practical level. The socialist constitution
of Cuba does not guarantee a right to housing. 7 Throughout
79. 1976 CONST. art. 25.
80. Id. art. 22.
81. Id. art. 20.
82. Id. art. 15.
83. Id. art. 22.
84. Id. art. 15.
85. Id. art. 24. The official reason that small-farmer property was treated as its
own class of property separate from both state and personal property was in order
to recognize that farmers would need a different method to transform them to social-
ism. See ALVAREZ TABiO, COMENTARIOS A LA CONSTITUCION SOCIALISTA [COMMENTAR-
IES ON THE SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION] 89 (1985). Consuegra-Barquin suggests that
small farmer property was given a privileged and secure position in order to fore-
stall immigration to the cities and encourage food production. Juan C. Consuegra-
Barquin, Cuba's Residential Property Ownership Dilemma: A Human Rights Issue
Under International Law, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 873, 910 (1994).
86. Decreto-Ley 50 (Sobre asociaci6n econ6mica entre entidades cubanas y
extranjeras) [Concerning economic association between Cuban and foreign entities],
GACETA OFICIAL, Feb. 15, 1982 [hereinafter Law-Decree 50]. Law-Decree 50 was
incorporated into the Constitution as Article 23 of the 1976 Constitution on August
1, 1992. See 1992 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM LAW art. 23.
87. See 1976 CONST.; 1992 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM LAW.
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the term of the Revolutionary government, the construction of
housing has been subordinated to agricultural and industrial
production, particularly to the desire to increase the sugar cane
harvest." The construction of housing in metropolitan Havana
was slighted in favor of housing construction at sugar production
facilities in the provinces." According to the Cuban housing
scholar Jill Hamberg, new housing construction just barely ac-
counted for population growth and housing loss through building
collapse and demolition, which was particularly acute in older
parts of Havana. 0 Hamberg reports that approximately one-
half of the 1.4 million housing units built between 1959 and
1988 are substandard.9 Furthermore, extended and even unre-
lated families are often crowded together in a few small rooms9
because it is nearly impossible for new households to enter the
housing system. 3 Nevertheless, almost half of the country's
existing dwelling units were built since 1959." The lack of ade-
quate housing is considered by many experts to be the most
pressing problem in Cuba today.9"
C. Primary Initiatives Relating to Residential Real Estate
The 1960 Urban Reform Law,"6 and the subsequent 1984
General Housing Law 7 and 1988 General Housing Law,9" es-
tablished two basic forms of urban tenure: home ownership and
88. See Jill Hamberg, Cuba, in HOUSING POLICIES OF THE SOCIALIST THIRD
WORLD 35, 38 (K Mathey ed., 1990) [hereinafter Hamberg, Cuba].
89. Id. Between 1946 and 1958, fifty-five percent of all new dwelling units were
constructed in metropolitan Havana, compared with only twenty-five percent of all
new dwelling units completed between 1959 and 1970. Id.
90. Id. at 40.
91. Id. at 37.
92. See Lynda Grove, Hopes of Reviving Cuba's Capital Dry Up in Economic
Drought, CHi. TRIB., Aug. 16, 1992, at C21.
93. Id.
94. Hamberg, Cuba, supra note 88, at 40. Hamberg derives her estimate from
the 1981 census.
95. See Cuba: Past, Present and Future, supra note 40, 41, at 153-54. Experts
estimate that between 600,000 and 800,000 housing units are currently needed in
Cuba. Id. at 154.
96. Ley de Reforma Urbana [Urban Reform Law], GACETA OFICIAL, Oct. 14,
1960 (hereinafter Urban Reform Law].
97. Ley No. 48, Ley General de la Vivienda (General Housing Law], GACETA
OFICIAL, Dec. 31, 1984 [hereinafter 1984 General Housing Law].
98. Ley No. 65, Ley General de la Vivienda [General Housing Law], GACETA
OFICLAL, Dec. 23, 1988 [hereinafter 1988 General Housing Law].
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long-term lease-holding from the government.
The primary goal of the Urban Reform Law in its first stage
was to replace rental arrangements with the ownership of dwell-
ing units by their occupants. The Urban Reform Law declared
null and void all existing leases of residential property.99 All
rental property was confiscated and legal title of property was
conferred on the tenant or subtenant in each dwelling unit."°
After deducting the rent already paid by the tenant, the newly
formed Urban Reform Committee determined the compensation
to be paid the former owner, establishing an "amortization"
period between five to twenty years during which monthly pay-
ments would be made directly to the state.10' Even though the
state was required to turn the monthly payment over to the
former landlord, it evidently almost never did."0 2 The transfer
of property without prior permission from the state was prohibit-
ed and the state reserved the right to repurchase any property
at the price previously established by the Urban Reform Com-
mittee."° Eventually, the monthly payment was calculated
based on an official approximation of the unit's quality, location
and depreciation.' By the end of 1988, 450,000 former renters
had taken advantage of this new policy.0"
Another important goal of the Urban Reform Law was to
destroy the traditional mortgage by turning the government into
the mortgagee. °6 The Urban Reform Law required cancellation
of all existing mortgage agreements and required homeowners to
99. See Urban Reform Law, supra note 96, art. 5.
100. Id. art. 1. The Urban Reform Law had two rural analogs: the Agrarian Re-
form Laws of 1959 and 1963, which effectively granted tenant farmers title to their
land. [Primera] Ley de Reforms Agraria [First Agrarian Reform Law], GACETA
OFICIAL, June 3, 1959 [hereinafter First Agrarian Reform Law]; Segunda Ley de
Reforma Agraria [Second Agrarian Reform Law], GACETA OFICIAL, Oct. 3, 1963 [here-
inafter Second Agrarian Reform Law].
101. Urban Reform Law, supra note 96, art. 13; see also id. arts. 7-9, 29.
102. See Emilio C. Cueto, Property Claims of Cuban Nationals 16, Address at
the Resolution of Property Claims in Cuba's Transition Workshop, Washington, D.C.
(Jan. 26, 1995). Cueto hints that no compensation was paid. Id. I have found no
definitive documentation indicating that the compensation guaranteed by the various
Cuban expropriation laws aimed at Cuban nationals was actually paid.
103. Urban Reform Law, supra note 96, art. 29.
104. See Hamberg, Cuba, supra note 88, at 56.
105. Jill Hamberg, Cuban Housing Policy, in TRANSFORMATION AND STRUGGLE
236, 237-38 (Sandor Halesby & John Kirk eds., 1990) [hereinafter Hamberg, Cuban
Housing Policy].
106. Urban Reform Law, supra note 96, arts. 30-36.
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continue making payments to the government instead of the
bank."0 7 Landlords of mortgaged property had their property
confiscated and were offered minimal or no compensation.'"
Persons or corporations holding the mortgages received no com-
pensation, except for commercial banks, who were to receive Cu-
ban government bonds. 9 The Urban Reform Law also man-
dated that the government use the proceeds of the mortgage
payments to build new rental housing." °
Under the Urban Reform Law, monthly rental payments
were capped at ten percent of household income, regardless of
the size, location or quality of the housing.'' One component
of this plan involved the implementation of various programs
whereby urban slum dwellers were recruited into teams to build
their own new dwellings." Because all maintenance of rental
buildings was transferred to local governmental authorities,
these structures soon fell into a state of chronic disrepair."'
The maintenance and repair of low-rise complexes was later
delegated to "self-managed" resident councils."' The mainte-
nance of high rise complexes remained with local governmental
authorities."
The majority of lease-holders in government units, approxi-
mately 460,000 households representing one-fifth of all house-
holds, were converted to homeowners through the 1984 General
Housing Law, which established an amortization schedule of
twenty years."'
By 1970, the national housing shortage, estimated to be at
one million dwelling units, had reached extreme proportions." 7
In response, the government developed the concept of
microbrigades: groups of twenty-five to thirty-five employees
from a particular workplace who, under the direction of the Con-
107. Id.
108. See JILL HAMBERG, UNDER CONSTRUCTION: HOUSING POLICY IN REVOLUTION-
ARY CUBA 3 (1986) [hereinafter HAMBERG, UNDER CONSTRUCTION].
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Urban Reform Law, supra note 96, art. 1.
112. Hamberg, Cuba, supra note 88, at 52.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 51.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 57.
117. Id. at 53.
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struction Ministry, built housing units while the other members
of the workplace remained in place maintaining production quo-
tas.11 Units in the newly-built housing would then be distrib-
uted throughout the workplace based on workplace "perfor-
mance, " 119 or more exactly, political favoritism.2  The
microbrigades fostered a building boom, building half of all gov-
ernment-sponsored housing during the 1972 to 1975 period, and
virtually dominated the provision of housing in urban areas.
Microbrigades were responsible for building large-scale housing
projects of four and five story walk-up buildings, using tradition-
al construction methods, and Cuba's first urban renewal pro-
jects, in which twelve to eighteen story towers replaced urban
slums." The rapid growth of the microbrigades continued un-
til 1975, when the government finally recognized that micr-
obrigade-produced buildings were both more expensive and of
lower quality than buildings built by other methods and that the
system was fundamentally unfair, as workers in workplaces that
did not qualify for a microbrigade had almost no possibility of
obtaining housing."' Due to the fact that a worker changing
employment retained the right to inhabit the unit she helped
build, some industries reported that fully twenty percent of their
housing units were occupied by persons employed elsewhere.'
Microbrigades continued at a slower pace, at least through the
mid-1980s, as their relative importance diminished with state
brigades increasingly entering the housing sector.' In 1987,
the number of microbrigades devoted to housing construction
was increased, just as all private contracting was eliminated.' 8
Still, housing completions declined by five percent in 1988.'
The focus of the economy on sugar production and the fail-
ings of official Cuban housing policy resulted in insufficient new
housing construction. In fact, an even more severe housing
118. Id. at 53-55.
119. Id.
120. Interview with resident of Alamar Housing Project who constructed his
apartment through a microbrigade program (May 28, 1995).
121. Hamberg, Cuba, supra note 88, at 38.
122. Id. at 49.
123. Id. at 61.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 64. Hamberg reports that by 1983, microbrigades had produced over
100,000 housing units. Id.
126. See Cuba: Past, Present and Future, supra note 40, 41, at 153-54.
127. Id.
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shortage was forestalled only through the regime of self-built
housing" and the large number of vacancies created by emi-
grating Cubans who "abandoned" their property. In addition,
more than two-thirds of the units constructed from 1970 through
1981 were constructed through self-help.'29 Because the gov-
ernment provided no financing for self-help construction, financ-
ing was often diverted from state-sponsored home repair pro-
grams. 3 Self-help units were often built on vacant land sold
privately, or more likely, on state-owned vacant land that had
been confiscated and either sold to, or simply occupied by, the
new owners.'3' Evidently, it was possible for a citizen seeking
a lot on which to build to identify the preferred site and then,
using the machinery of the "vacant lot laws," force the owner to
sell at a fraction of the actual value of the land.
32
The self-help sector represents a major failure of Cuban
housing policy. As building codes were almost completely ig-
nored, nearly half of the units built are of poor quality." Be-
cause zoning regulations were not enforced, almost all of the
self-help units are single family homes, oftentimes constructed
on close-in land more suited to commercial or office use, result-
ing in urban sprawl.'34 In many instances, the required infra-
structure has not reached such developments.3 5 The 1984 Gen-
eral Housing Law brought self-help units under regulation by
bestowing title on such units.
3 6
128. Hamberg, Cuba, supra note 88, at 59.
129. Id. at 59.
130. Id. at 60.
131. Id.
132. Id. "Vacant lot laws" (specifically Law-Decrees No. 691, No. 717 and No.
218), which were passed even before the Urban Reform Law, required land owners
to commence building on all vacant land within six months or sell the property at
an extortionate rate (four dollars (U.S.) per square meter) to someone willing to do
so. Id. at 3. See Ley No. 691 [Law No. 691], Cuad. XV, Dec. 23, 1959, at 208; Ley
No. 717 [Law No. 717], Cuad. XVI, GACETA OFICIAL, Feb. 4, 1960; Ley No. 218 [Law
No. 218], Cuad. VI, Apr. 7, 1959, at 44.
133. See Hamberg, Cuba, supra note 88, at 59-60.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 1984 General Housing Law, supra note 97.
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D. Title to Property in the Cuban Context
As of 1994, as many as ninety-one percent of households
held title to their property. 3 7 However, it may be deceptive to
take the concept of title in the Cuban context at face value, be-
cause "title" as conferred by the Urban Reform Law and sub-
sequent laws is much more restricted than classical notions of
title in the capitalist world. 3 ' For example, the new title was
not freely alienable; any further transfer of title in any house or
apartment required the approval of the Urban Reform Commit-
tee. "' The state retained the right of first refusal at its offi-
cially determined price."4 The only exception to this policy was
the permuta arrangement instituted in the 1970s, whereby Cu-
bans were allowed to exchange property on a bilateral or multi-
lateral basis.'' Until the 1984 General Housing Law was im-
plemented, housing tenure status in housing exchanges was
based not on the unit, but on the household.' Hence, title
would automatically move with a family that transferred proper-
ty and would not be alienated in the exchange. Furthermore, at
deaths the right to remain on the property and to amortize the
property was limited solely to persons living with the deceased
for at least a full year before death." If an individual died
without such cohabitating survivors, the dwelling reverted to the
state, with any heirs receiving only a proportional amount of the
government-determined value.1
E. Survey of Housing in Havana Today
One of the first tasks of the Housing Ministry should be to
conduct a survey of the existing housing conditions in Havana.
137. Cubans Respond to Questions, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 18, 1994, at A37.
138. Guti~rrez, supra note 72 (citing Douglas E. Matthews, Real Property Law
under the Current Cuban Regime 1 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author)).
139. Id. at 13 (citing Ignacio E. Sdnchez, Cuban Property Rights and the 1940
Constitution 8-9 (1993) (unpublished manuscript)).
140. Hamberg, Cuba, supra note 88, at 59-60.
141. EVENSON, supra note 48, at 182-83.
142. Id. at 178-85.
143. Id. Inheritance rights were expanded by the 1984 General Housing Law to
allow non-cohabiting heirs to inherit dwelling units.
144. Id.
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An analysis of the housing fabric in Havana will determine a
spectrum of housing types and locations. These will range from
prime residential property, which will become the focus of gen-
trification, to various types of undesirable property that, without
intervention, will become slum areas. Even without such a sur-
vey, the conceptual framework for developing sound policy based
on understanding existing housing needs and anticipated market
developments can be formulated.
The buildings which will be most prone to gentrification are
the structurally solid and architecturally significant, low-rise
buildings constructed before 1959. Those buildings that are
located in areas close to the center of the city, near major trans-
portation arteries or in primarily residential neighborhoods will
be considered the most desirable.
On the other hand, architecturally undistinguished build-
ings constructed after 1959, with major structural problems will
be least desirable. Such buildings are at severe risk of deteriora-
tion and disinvestment. Likewise, buildings that are far from
major transportation arteries, in industrial or commercial areas,
or in otherwise polluted areas will be considered least desirable.
IV. WEIGHING THE ISSUE OF RESTITUTION
The restitution of confiscated property has been a pivotal
issue in American relations with Cuba since the Revolution. The
confiscation of properties belonging to U.S. citizens without
adequate compensation was the primary motivation behind the
United States' embargo first imposed on Cuba in 19 6 0 ."45
Alonso and Lago estimated the claims of Cuban exiles to be $6.9
billion in 1957 dollars, equivalent to approximately $20.02 bil-
lion in 1993 dollars.4 6 In addition, the issue of restitution is
considerably more important in Cuba than in other post-socialist
nations due to the unprecedented percentage of land that was
nationalized in Cuba.14 By 1988, 92% of all farm land had
145. Castafieda & Montalv~n, supra note 16, at 1. For a discussion of the em-
bargo, see supra note 36.
146. Jos6 F. Alonso & Armando M. Lago, A First Approximation of the Foreign
Assistance Requirements of a Democratic Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSITION, 3D MEETING
OF THE ASSOC. FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECON. 168, 202-04 (1993).
147. Cueto, supra note 102, at 22 (citing Jan Svejnar & Jorge P~rez-L6pez, A
Strategy for Economic Transformation of Cuba Based on the East European Experi-
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been nationalized in Cuba, compared with only 8% in Poland,
14% in the former Soviet Union and 17% in the former East
Germany.'"
A. The Legal Case for Restitution
A number of mechanisms were used by the Revolutionary
government in seizing property. The particular mechanism in-
volved in each case may well determine the legal validity of the
taking. Property takings involved both confiscation and expropri-
ation. Confiscation is the seizure of private property without
compensation, usually as a form of punishment related to the
person subject to the taking, and not the property itself.149 Ex-
propriation involves the taking by the state of specific property
for a public purpose independent of the identity of the own-
er.50 The takings of property owned by Cuban nationals took
place primarily by three different mechanisms:151 (i) the confis-
cation of property owned by officials of or collaborators with the
Batista regime;'52 (ii) the expropriation of property required to
transform Cuba to a socialist state, as expressed in the Agrarian
Reform Law of 1959 (First Agarian Reform Law)"5 and the Ur-
ban Reform Law of 1960;' and (iii) the confiscation of
property "abandoned" by fleeing emigrants under Law 989 of
ence, in CUBA AFrER THE COLD WAR 336 (Carmelo Mesa-Lago ed., 1993)).
148. Id.
149. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
150. Id. at 616.
151. For an excellent overview of the mechanics of property expropriation, see
Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban
Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 217
(1995).
152. Article 24 of the Fundamental Law permitted the "recovery" of property
that had been "misappropriated" during the Batista regime. Ley Fundamental, art.
24 GACETA OFICiAL, Feb. 7, 1959 [hereinafter Fundamental Law]. Article 24 was the
stated legal authority for the promulgation of three subsequent laws putatively
aimed at recovering the misappropriated property from three targeted groups: (i) of-
ficials of the Batista government, Law 112 (Feb. 27, 1959) [Law for the Recovery of
Misappropriated Properties], amended by Law 151 (Mar. 17, 1959); (ii) collaborators
with the Batista government, Law 438 (Feb. 19, 1959), amended by Law 746 (July
7, 1959); and (iii) persons fleeing the country to avoid jurisdiction of the Revolution-
ary courts, Law 664 (Dec. 23, 1959). Consuegra-Barquln argues that each of these
three laws is unconstitutional because it exceeds the authority granted in Article 24
of the Fundamental Law. See Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 85, at 900-01.
153. See First Agrarian Reform Law, supra note 100.
154. See Urban Reform Law, supra note 96.
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1961 (Law 989)155 and the prior related Resolution Number
454.15 Law 989 effectively confiscated the property of Cubans
fleeing Revolutionary Cuba for economic and political reasons on
the premise that the property they left behind was "abandoned"
and therefore became state property.'57
There is no clearly recognized legal right in international
law to the restitution of or compensation for property seized by
one's own government.5 It is well-established that interna-
tional law principles provide only for the "prompt, adequate and
effective" compensation where the property of aliens has been
confiscated.'59 The argument has been made that the right of
property is an emerging international human right, as evidenced
by the implementation of restitution and compensation schemes
in post-socialist Eastern Europe 6° and a 1974 position of the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees recognizing a
right to private property for stateless Asians whose property had
been expropriated in Uganda.16' If the right to private property
is a fundamental human right, then arguably a country confis-
cating the property of its citizens would be required to provide
compensation at the least."2 However, considering the weight
of authority to the contrary, there does not seem to be a plau-
sible argument that international law currently recognizes such
a right. 6" Therefore, any legal argument for the restitution of
155. Ley No. 989 [Law No. 989), GACETA OFICIAL, Dec. 6, 1961, at 23,705 [here-
inafter Law 989].
156. Resoluci6n No. 454 (Resolution No. 454], GACETA OFICIAL, Oct. 9, 1961, at
19,310.
157. See Law No. 989. All business property held by U.S. citizens was expropri-
ated under different legal authority. Ley No. 851 [Law No. 851], GACETA OFICIAL,
Aug. 6, 1960. See also MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE
DEMISE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CUBA 69-108 (1975).
158. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 861 (2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush,
256 F. Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd per curiam, 375 F.2d. 1011 (2d. Cir.
1967); Banco Nacional de Cuba V. Farr, 272 F. Supp. 836, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd
383 F.2d. 166, 184-85 (1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 956 (1968); Jaffari v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209, 215 (N.D. Ill. 1982); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 702, cmt K.
159. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 237, 240 (1983); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 185-90.
160. Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 85, at 886-892.
161. Id. at 889 (citing report of the High Commissioner for Refugees, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 12A) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/9612/Add.1 (1974)).
162. Id. at 886-892.
163. Even the most recent edition of the Restatement does not recognize a right
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or compensation for confiscated property in Cuba must proceed
under an analysis of Cuban law.' "
Looking to Cuba's domestic legal structure to determine the
validity of restitution and compensation claims is at best an
extremely complex analysis. This complexity derives from the
fact that the Cuban legal regime is an amalgam of multiple
layers of law and legal culture dating from before Cuba's inde-
pendence in 1902 to the present and that there is considerable
argument concerning what legal authority governs today, or
even what legal authority has governed since the Cuban Revolu-
tion began in 1959.
The Constitution of 1901 (1901 Constitution), Cuba's
first, was promulgated by the occupying U.S. military governor,
who modeled it after the United States Constitution.' The
1901 Constitution contained the notorious Platt Amendment,
Article VII, which allowed the United States to regulate actions
of the Cuban government and made Cuba a virtual protectorate
of the United States.
167
Following the 1933 revolution, the major political parties,
representing a broad spectrum from right to left, convened to
draft the new constitution promulgated in 1940." The pro-
gressive Constitution of 1940 (1940 Constitution), considered to
be a model for many Latin American constitutions, guaranteed
the rights to employment and collective bargaining and estab-
to property. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987). See sources supra notes 158-159.
164. Cuban-Americans are presumably barred from seeking compensation as for-
eign nationals because well-established international law principles limit a state to
protecting the interests of only those individuals who were nationals of the state at
the time of the expropriations. See D. W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 530-31 (2d. ed.
1976). This principle has been violated by the United States in settling claims with
both Czechoslovakia and Nicaragua, when, in each instance, the U.S. reached a set-
tlement in the interest of nationals of those countries who later became American
citizens. See Vrativlav Pechota, Current Development: The 1981 U.S.- Czechoslovakia
Claims Settlement Agreement: An Epilogue to Postwar Nationalization and Expropria-
tion Disputes, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 640 (1982); WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1994 at A28.
165. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA [Constitution] (Cuba) [hereinafter
1901 CONST.I, GACETA OFICIAL, Apr. 14, 1902.
166. Franklin W. Knight, Cuba, in THE MODERN CARIBBEAN 169, 170-71 (Frank-
lin W. Knight & Cohn A. Palmer eds., 1989).
167. 1901 CONST. art. 7. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, CUBA:
A COUNTRY STUDY 159 (1987) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDY].
168. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA [Constitution] (Cuba) [hereinafter
1940 CONST.], GACETA OFICIAL, Apr. 6, 1943.
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lished a minimum wage, maximum work week, maternity leave
and, perhaps most importantly, the right to private property.'69
The 1940 Constitution, which was honored only in the breach by
the Batista regime, is considered by many exiles to be "the last
legitimate expression of the constitutional will of the Cuban peo-
ple" and therefore still in effect today. 7 ' The 1940 Constitution
remains the putative object of restoration of the exile communi-
ty, although arguably it was never really in effect.
After seizing power, the Revolutionary government amended
the 1940 Constitution with the Fundamental Law of the Revolu-
tion (Fundamental Law) in February 1959.171 Even though the
Fundamental Law was intended only to revise and supplement,
rather than nullify, the Constitution of 1940,172 it made funda-
mental changes in the structure of government.'73 Most impor-
tantly, the Fundamental Law allowed the Council of Ministers,
with the approval of the President, to amend the Constitution
without following specified legislative procedures. 7 4 Although
the Fundamental Law did not substantively change the guaran-
tee of private property7 ' or the expropriation clause7 of the
1940 Constitution, it did allow the retroactive confiscation of the
property of officials of and collaborators with the Batista govern-
ment. 
177
The 1976 Constitution was promulgated because of the con-
stant need to amend the Fundamental Law.'7  The 1976 Con-
169. Id. arts. 60, 61, 66, 71, 72, 87.
170. Guti~rrez, supra note 72, at 18.
171. See Fundamental Law, supra note 152.
172. Id. The Fundamental Law contains no provision repealing the 1940 Consti-
tution. Fidel Castro explicitly stated that the goal of the 1959 Revolution was to re-
establish the 1940 Constitution, which had been flagrantly ignored by the Batista
dictatorship. See Radl Marrero, La castraci6n de un proceso democrdtico, [The Cas-
tration of a Democratic Process], EL NUEVO DIA, Mar. 26, 1992, at 72.
173. See Fundamental Law, supra note 152, art. 232.
174. Article 232 of the Fundamental Law effectively nullified Article 285 (requir-
ing a super-majority of a vote of Congress to amend the Constitution) and Article
286 (requiring a constitutional convention or plebiscite for major constitutional re-
forms) of the 1940 Constitution. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 151, at 236.
175. Compare Fundamental Law, supra note 152, art. 87 with 1940 CONST.,
supra note 168, art. 87.
176. Compare Fundamental Law, supra note 152, art. 24 with 1940 CONST.,
supra note 168, art. 24.
177. See Fundamental Law, supra note 152, arts. 21, 24.
178. 1976 CONST. Evidently, one of the reasons the 1976 Constitution was so
long in coming was the difficulty the drafters had in reconciling the existing Spanish
Civil Code with socialist law concepts. See Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 85, at
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stitution, modeled on the 1936 Soviet Constitution,'79 estab-
lished a "socialist legality" as the juridical and legal foundation
of the country in an attempt to curtail the excesses of revolution-
ary fervor embodied in the Fundamental Law, which allowed
government officials to act beyond the law."8 The 1976 Con-
stitution clearly established the right of the state, in the name of
the people, to all land, except that of small farmers and agricul-
tural cooperatives,'' and left the expropriations clause in-
tact. 182
A controversial issue in the Cuban exile community is
whether the 1959 Revolution and all subsequent actions taken
by the Revolutionary government should be accorded legal valid-
ity. If specific acts of the Revolutionary government, such as the
seizure of "abandoned" property, can be proven to be unconstitu-
tional, then Cuban domestic law alone will suffice to validate
restitution claims. The laws permitting certain property sei-
zures, such as the First Agrarian Reform Law and the Urban
Reform Law, were based on the authority of the Fundamental
Law, which fundamentally altered existing legal norms." 3 De-
spite arguments that the Revolutionary government did not
have the power to fundamentally alter the existing legal
norms,' it is well-established in international law that ac-
tions taken by revolutionary governments are valid and that,
therefore, the Revolutionary government had the power to estab-
lish new legal norms. 85 For the acts of a revolutionary govern-
896-97.
179. See KONST. [Constitution] (U.S.S.R.) (1936). Compare, e.g., Articles 66-98,
Supreme Organs of the People's Party of the 1976 CONST. (Cuba) with Articles 30-
56, The Higher Organs of State Power in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of
the 1936 Soviet Constitution.
180. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 167, at 162.
181. 1976 CONST. art. 15.
182. Id. art. 25.
183. See First Agrarian Reform Law, supra note 100; see Urban Reform Law,
supra note 96; see Fundamental Law, supra note 152.
184. See Jose D. Acosta, El Marco Juridico-Institutional de un Gobierno Provi-
sional de Unidad Nacional en Cuba [The Juridical-Institutional Framework of a
Provisional Government of National Unity in Cuba], in CUBA IN TRANSITION, 2ND
MEETING OF THE ASSOC. FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECON. 61, 78-82 (1992).
185. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 117, 187-88
(1961); Travieso-Diaz, supra note 151, at 241-42. Even under the most conservative
analysis, which distinguishes between the legitimacy of a government (a non-
judicable political and moral issue) and the legal validity of the government's acts (a
judicable issue), the actions of the Revolutionary government are arguably legally
valid; Tayvab Mahmud, Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coup d'Etat & Common
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ment to be considered valid, international law norms require
only that political control be exercised over the territory and
that the population acquiesce in the newly established order."
These conditions were met from the start in Revolutionary Cu-
ba. 87 As one scholar concluded, "[d]enying legal validity to the
revolutionary laws is therefore denying reality."' Even if the
takings are considered constitutional, the Cuban government
would still have an obligation to provide some form of compensa-
tion.8' The Fundamental Law, under whose authority the ex-
propriations were executed, requires that compensation be
paid.1
90
Other types of property seizures, such as the confiscation of
"abandoned" properties under Law 989, could possibly be found
unconstitutional because they violate the new legal norms estab-
lished by the Revolution. 9' Because Law 989 explicitly violates
the requirements of the Fundamental Law that seized properties
be taken for an express public purpose and that compensation be
provided, 92 it is arguably unconstitutional within the then-
existing legal norms. 93 In fact, the seizure of property pursu-
ant to Law 989 was not in recovery of assets "misappropriated"
by the Batista regime as required under the Fundamental
Law, 94 nor was the abandonment of such property voluntary.
Thus, within the norms of the then-existing law, coerced aban-
donment is an illegal confiscation of the property of absentee
owners and not the expropriation of abandoned property.1 95
Furthermore, such property seizures were illegal because the
seizure of items of personal consumption, such as private resi-
Law, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 49 (1994).
186. See KELSEN, supra note 185, at 187-88. Travieso-Diaz notes that the test
for determining the validity of a government's acts is parallel to the test required by
foreign countries in recognizing a revolutionary government. See Travieso-Diaz supra
note 151, at 237 n.74. For citations to cases from numerous jurisdictions applying
the principle within the past decade, see id. at 237 n.73.
187. The Cuban Revolution was overwhelmingly popular at the time the Funda-
mental Law, which was endorsed by numerous leaders in the Cuban legal commu-
nity, was promulgated. See Cueto, supra note 102, at 14.
188. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 151, at 237.
189. Id. at 36.
190. See Fundamental Law, supra note 152, art. 24.
191. See Travieso-Dfaz, supra note 151, at 235.
192. See Fundamental Law, supra note 152, art. 24.
193. See Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 85, at 904-06.
194. See Fundamental Law, supra note 152, art. 24; Law 989, supra note 155.
195. Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 85, at 904-06.
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dences, was inconsistent with the general principles of socialist
property law.196 The confiscations were also arguably discrimi-
natory in that they targeted a class of people based on their po-
litical beliefs. 19 7 Additionally, because the current civil code
permits usucapio (the analog to adverse possession under Span-
ish civil law) pursuant only to good faith possession, property
seizures might be invalid in a small number of instances where
the former owner could prove bad faith possession.'98
The issue of restitution is further complicated by invest-
ments made by new parties pursuant to Law-Decree 50.' De-
termining the legal validity of investments made by foreign
entities in properties that are the subject of restitution claims
imposes further complication in the resolution of restitution
claims. As permitted under Law-Decree 50, foreign enterprises
have entered into hundreds of joint venture agreements with
various corporate entities of the Cuban government.0 ° Many of
these transactions arguably represent a fire sale of the national
patrimony, making it probable that such transactions will be
disregarded by a future regime.0 1 Prominent Cuban exiles
have made it clear that, in a post-Castro Cuba, any property
rights obtained through the joint enterprise scheme will not be
recognized,2" a view that is certain to lead to extensive inter-
196. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 151, at 235.
197. Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 85, at 904.
198. Id. at 912-22, 926-28, Diagram. The 1889 Civil Code, which was inherited
from Spain, recognized both good faith possession, with a minimum term of posses-
sion of ten years against a present proprietor and twenty years against an absent
proprietor, and bad faith possession, with a minimum term of possession of ten
years against any proprietor. COD. Civ. [CIVIL CODE], arts. 1940, 1959 (1889) (Cuba).
The 1889 Civil Code was replaced by the Socialist Civil Code of 1988, which recog-
nized good faith usucapio only, with a minimum term of possession of five years
against any proprietor. COD. CIV. [CIVIL CODE] law 59, art. 186.1 (1988) (Cuba).
199. Law-Decree 50, supra note 86.
200. See Appendix 1.- Current Investments in Cuba, in INVESTING IN CUBA 172-
176 (Jaime Suchlinki & Antonio Jorge eds., 1994).
201. Alberto Luzrraga, Business Perspective on Investment in Cuba, in INVEST-
ING IN CuBA 63 (Jaime Suchlicki & Antonio Jorge eds., 1994).
202. In 1993, a group of eleven exile organizations co-authored an "Open Letter
to Investors" warning foreign investors against investing in these enterprises under
the Castro regime. Otto Reich, Investing in Cuba: A Personal View, in INVESTING IN
CUBA 51, 54 (Jaime Suchlicki & Antonio Jorge eds., 1994). See also Christopher
Marquis, Investments in Cuba Are an Act of Collaboration, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 22,
1994, at A19. Jorge Mas Canosa delivered a letter on behalf of CANF to several
foreign embassies in Washington, D.C. stating that "You are taking a major risk and
will incur major losses by doing business in Cuba during the tenure of the dictator-
ship of Fidel Castro." Id.
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national litigation. The Helms-Burton Legislation, enacted into
law on March 12, 1996, grants U.S. nationals, defined to include
persons who were Cuban nationals at the time their property
was seized, the right to sue persons "trafficking" (which is effec-
tively defined as deriving any economic benefit from) in such
seized property. °3 The Helms-Burton Legislation is certain to
lead to extensive litigation and further cloud the issue of prop-
erty rights.
Thus, there is no clear, overriding legal right to the restitu-
tion of residential property in Cuba. A legal analysis yields a
complex set of results whereby a small minority of persons,
primarily those whose property was confiscated because of their
presumed affiliation with the Batista regime, may have a legal
right to restitution, whereas the larger portion of the population
may have, at most, a right to some form of compensation. From
a strictly legal point of view, the level of compensation owed
would be determined solely within the context of what is consti-
tutionally required by Cuban domestic law, for which there is
little or no precedent.
B. The Economic Case for Restitution
Economic arguments that are frequently made for the resti-
tution of confiscated property by the exile community include
that: (i) only by respecting the integrity of pre-Revolutionary
Cuban law, which protected private property rights, can the
stability necessary for growth be assured; (ii) given Cuba's pov-
erty, compensation is not a possibility and restitution remains
the only viable option; (iii) restitution will be the fastest way to
jump-start and recapitalize the moribund economy; (iv) only
former owners possess the necessary managerial skills required
to transform the economy; and (v) restitution has been the key
to economic success in other formerly socialist states in their
privatization schemes. 4
It is frequently argued that restitution is the fastest way to
get the economy back on its feet. The development of a restitu-
tion scheme is, however, complicated and time-consuming. Resti-
tution cannot simply be announced. A complex scheme that
203. See Helms-Burton Legislation, supra note 36, §§ 4, 103, 301-06.
204. See Castafieda & Montalvdn, supra note 16, at 12.
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recognizes the multiplicity of interests and parties involved must
be developed and implemented. The restitution of any parcel of
confiscated property would involve a minimum of four parties:
the original owner, the present occupant, the new Cuban govern-
mental authority, and the government of the country of which
the exile is now a citizen, as a "shadow party."2 5 In addition,
any transfers of property during the Revolution through ar-
rangements such as the permuta,0 6 or which occurred during
later waves of emigration, such as the Mariel boat lift, would
involve additional interested parties. Furthermore, any such pro-
cedure will involve administrative apparatus and competence for
which an interim government will not be prepared. For example,
the United States, in its adjudication of the 8,792 claims of U.S.
citizens against Cuba, developed a matrix of twenty-eight differ-
ent criteria for eight different types of property.2 7 An interim
Cuban government will most likely be faced with hundreds of
thousands of claims.2 °8
In Eastern Europe, the implementation of restitution
legislation precipitated a marked and immediate economic de-
cline, as property disputes between former owners, current occu-
piers and other interested parties mushroomed, further obfus-
cating property rights and creating a climate of legal uncertain-
ty.2" In the former Czechoslovakia, implementation of the res-
titution program lead to a massive increase in litigation that
brought the court system to a standstill.210 Because of the un-
certainty of the timing and ultimate resolution of the dispute,
both foreign and local investment ceased and the occupants of
contested property abandoned maintenance efforts.2" ' As sever-
al noted former Czechoslovakian economists had predicted, the
restitution of property actually slowed down privatization and
halted the influx of foreign capital.212 In effect, a restitution
205. Cueto, supra note 102, at 26.
206. Permuta arrangements often involved property that was confiscated from
the original owner as abandoned property. Id. at 29-30.
207. Id. at 26-27.
208. Dresden, a relatively small city in the former East Germany, was deluged
with over 40,000 claims for property restitution from former owners, for which it
had only 60 property evaluators. FIN. TIMES, June 17, 1992.
209. Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 85, at 923.
210. CHERYL W. GRAY, EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DE-
VELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 4, 49 (World Bank Discussion Paper
No. 209, 1993).
211. Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 85, at 923.
212. Gelpern, supra note 9, at 324-25 (summarizing Group of Economists Express
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scheme brings the affected sector of the economy to a virtual
standstill until claims are resolved.
Still, it is argued that restoring property to its former own-
ers would most efficiently allocate resources because the former
owners alone possess the unique entrepreneurial skills neces-
sary to transform the economy.213 This argument is premised
on rather faulty logic: it assumes that the high standard of liv-
ing that Cuba enjoyed before the Revolution was due primarily
to the efforts of Cuban entrepreneurs, and that these entrepre-
neurs could achieve the same results again. 14 Such reasoning
fails to recognize that thirty-seven years later most of these
same entrepreneurs are probably either retired or deceased.
Their heirs may have little or no interest or experience in busi-
ness. Furthermore, the former affluence of Cuba relative to that
of other Latin American countries may be due to many other
factors - including higher levels of foreign investment, proximi-
ty to the hemisphere's largest market, greater investment in
more advanced technology - other than to specific skills or
expertise of the former entrepreneurial class.
Furthermore, as business analysts have predicted, because
many nationals will greatly resent attempts by exiles to reassert
themselves in Cuban economic and political life, there will be an
unavoidable measure of social unrest in any event.215 A contro-
versy over restitution would only serve to inflame an already
tense situation, further delaying economic recovery and discour-
aging foreign investment. From both an economic and an equita-
ble point of view, restitution would lock Cuba into a 1959 pat-
tern of the distribution of wealth and production, which would
not only be unacceptable to the Cuban people, but would proba-
bly inhibit integration into the modern global economy.1 6 A
purely economic analysis clearly argues against restitution.
As concluded by two noted commentators on Eastern Euro-
pean events, Claus Offe and Frank Bonker, restitution has a net
negative economic impact on post-socialist states because it
Concern Over Restitution Bill, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 15, 1991,
available in LEXIS, World Library, AIiWid File.).
213. Gutidrrez, supra note 72, at 17.
214. Id.
215. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, DEVELOPING BUSINESS STRATEGIES
FOR CUBA (SPECIAL REPORT) 78 (1992).
216. Castafieda & Montalvdn, supra note 16, at 13. See supra note 76.
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potentially misallocates societal assets, muddles property rights,
recreates anachronistic land distribution that is inefficient in a
modem economy, encourages rent-seeking behavior, strains
states with limited financial and administrative resources, and
makes a lasting social consensus difficult to achieve.217
C. The Case for Restitution Based on the Practice of
Eastern Europe
The evolving, post-Cold War practice has been to provide
limited restitution of property confiscated from nationals of the
country.218 The actual practice of restitution in Eastern Europe
has, however, been animated primarily by arbitrary interests
and resentments. 9 Restitution has been given primarily for
property loss, but not for human rights violations, because of the
"strategic importance attached to property reform and the great-
er political leverage of former property owners compared with
other victims of the communist regime."220 In fact, the institu-
tion of a legal regime focused on the restitution of property to its
former owners has occurred primarily where the former commu-
nists and their allied technocratic elite were so discredited that
they were not able to capitalize on public awareness of the
country's severe economic problems.221 In states where the for-
mer communist regime had been most successful in eradicating
the private ownership of property and enforcing nationalization
and collectivization of property, the call for restitution was the
greatest.22 2 In the former Czechoslovakia, strong restitution
laws were favored largely as a reaction to the fact that socialist
state property had become the focus of hostility for all commu-
nist abuses.2" The post-socialist Czechoslovakian emphasis on
restitution, which was roundly criticized as "impractical," was
defended by Czechoslovakian leaders as required by a "greater
moral awareness" of the duty to return seized property.224
217. Claus Offe & Frank Bonker, Forum on Restitution, 2 EAST. EUR. CONST.
REV. 32 (1993).
218. Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 85, at 883.
219. Offe & B6nker, supra note 217, at 31.
220. Id.
221. Gelpern, supra note 9, at 318.
222. Id. at 324-25.
223. Id. at 324. Czechoslovakia had undergone the most large-scale collectiviza-
tion in the eastern European region. Id. at 324-25.
224. Czechs To Return Seized Property, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1991, at A10.
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The most successful restitution program instituted to date is
probably that of the former East Germany.225 The extensive
program in East Germany gave priority in the reversion of prop-
erty to the former owner, excluding situations where the proper-
ty had been purchased by a third person in good faith, altered
through substantial investment, dedicated to public use, or used
as a housing project or commercial enterprise where reversion
would severely impair the property."' The German program,
however, was possible solely because of the financing and ad-
ministrative expertise provided by the former West German
state, a fortunate circumstance that was without parallel else-
where in Eastern Europe. 7 The sole party capable of provid-
ing the requisite level of financial and administrative resources
to Cuba, the U.S. government, will not have the political legit-
imacy, much less domestic mandate, to do so. It is therefore be-
yond hope that a restitution program as extensive as the Ger-
man program could be replicated in Cuba.
D. Legitimate Bases for Providing Restitution
The most convincing argument for restitution seems to be
that, by firmly breaking the monopoly of the nomenklatura over
state assets, restitution helps legitimize the new and fledgling
property system and thereby support the democratization pro-
cess.2 There may, however, be more efficient and socially ac-
ceptable means other than restitution in which to break the
corrosive power of the nomenklatura.
Offe and Bonker have identified three conditions for deter-
mining when the restitution of appropriated property is legiti-
mate: (i) the seizure of property must be determined to have
been unlawful ( i.e., unconstitutional); (ii) the successor govern-
225. Thomas Raiser, The Challenge of Privatization in the Former East Germany:
Reconciling the Conflict between Individual Rights and Social Needs, in A FOURTH
WAY? PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET ECONOMIES
3-18 (Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Sapska eds., 1994).
226. Id. at 7-11.
227. See Domenico Mario Nuti, Economic Inertia in the Transitional Economies
of Eastern Europe, in IMPEDIMENTS TO THE TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE 25, 29-
30 (Milica Uvalic et al. eds., 1993). Nuti notes that the unified German government
spent $79 billion in 1991 and $105 billion in 1992 on the transformation program in
the former East Germany. Id. at 30 n.5.
228. Stephen Holmes, Forum on Restitution, 2 EAST. EUR. CONST. REV. 32-33
(1993).
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ment must have a duty to rectify the injustices of the regime it
has displaced; and (iii) the duty of restitution must take prece-
dence over other duties imposed on the new state,229 such as
preventing the return to power of the previous regime, jump-
starting a moribund economy or forestalling civil strife. In fact,
many Cuban-American business leaders, echoing Offe and
Bcnker, urge that economic restructuring take precedence over
the restitution of property because restitution would paralyze
the economy in endless litigation and delay economic revival.
If restitution is accomplished at all, it should be deferred until
the economy is revived and later implemented according to a
predetermined formula for the settlement of claims." Without
the strong support of the business community, who will be asked
to bear the risk, restitution is not a viable option.
E. Compensation as the Preferred Alternative
Restitution favors those who previously possessed physical
assets over those who possessed financial assets, valid contract
rights, or human capital.23 Restitution privileges those people
who suffered the deprivations of physical property over those
who suffered non-property related deprivations such as human
rights abuses. Some scholars have taken the following view:
[C]laims against the Cuban state should not be limited to
property claims, but should include all manner of torts -
involuntary or uncompensated work, unjust imprisonment,
loss of life or limb, loss of loved ones, physical or psychologi-
cal abuse, and harassment by agents of the state, discontinu-
ance of pension payments, etc. The people of Cuba, especially
those currently residing in that country, have suffered incal-
culable losses. We see no legal or moral basis for assigning
priority to settling claims against physical property over
those claiming civil damages such as those suggested
above.S
229. Offe & Bonker, supra note 217, at 30-31.
230. Rudi Dornbusch, Getting Ready for Cuba after Castro, Bus. WK., May 24,
1993, at 19.
231. Jorge Sanguinetty, The Transition Towards a Market Economy in Cuba: Its
Legal and Managerial Dimensions, in TRANSITION IN CUBA - NEW CHALLENGES FOR
U.S. POLICY 463, 479-81 (Lisandro Perez ed., 1993).
232. See Castafieda & MontalvAn, supra note 16, at 7.
233. Id. at 10-11 (emphasis in original).
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The assertion is not absurd. In Romania, a tort compensation
system was introduced where, instead of cash, injured parties
were granted benefits such as free public transportation and job
seniority.M In fact, one scholar suggests that the majority of
Cuban exiles would assign a higher priority to the compensation
of those who suffered human rights abuses than to those who
suffered property losses.' CANF, in its Transition Outline,
has stated that the proceeds of privatization will go to, among
other things, the compensation of "Cuban citizens" for human
rights violations committed by the communist government. 36
Schemes that focus primarily on compensation were insti-
tuted in several Eastern European countries, most notably Hun-
gary23 1 In the Hungarian compensation scheme, claimants
were offered state-issued bonds, or "compensation coupons,"
yielding seventeen percent interest.2' These bonds could be ex-
changed for property or shares in property directly from the
state, for land from farm cooperatives, for housing from local
councils, for a fixed pension with the state social security fund,
or used as collateral for bank loans or sold on the secondary
market.2 39 The Hungarian scheme has been suggested as a re-
alistic model for economically-ravaged Cuba because it takes
into account the interests of the current occupants of property
234. Id. at 14.
235. Cueto, supra note 102, at 25.
236. See TRANSITION OUTLINE, supra note 70, at 4. By using the term "Cuban
citizen," the Transition Outline clearly intends that the provision would apply to
both exiles and nationals.
237. See GRAY, supra note 210, at 70; see also ROMAN FRYDMAN ET AL., THE
PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 138 (1993).
238. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 237, at 138.
239. The first FT 200,000 of each claim is compensated in full. Id. For claims
over this amount, the compensation provided by the state decreases on a sliding
scale, with claims over FT 500,000 receiving only ten percent of the claim. See
GRAY, supra note 210, at 70. The maximum amount of compensation that any in-
dividual can receive is capped at FT 5 million. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 237, at
138. Land was directly auctioned by the state to the highest bidder. Id. The former
owners of land, who did not receive preferential treatment, could repurchase their
land using their coupons only if they were the highest bidder. Id. See also KATHER-
INE SIMONETTI, COMPENSATION AND RESOLUTION OF PROPERTY CLAIMS IN HUNGARY
69-72 (paper presented at the American Bar Association's 1994 Annual Meeting, New
Orleans, LA, 1994). In Hungary, property valuation for non-agricultural real estate
was calculated based on square footage and location. Location was classified as cen-
tral city [Budapest], provincial towns, villages and vacant lots. See Gelpern, supra
note 9, at 344.
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and avoids the costs and delays of direct restitution schemes.' °
The Hungarian scheme, however, can be faulted for the rela-
tively low level of compensation provided per individual claim-
ant and the difficulty the general populace encountered in effec-
tively using the system.241
One commentator analogizes the situation of Cuba to that of
a bankrupt debtor, arguing against restitution as a norm and for
compensation through a pro rata distribution of assets among
prioritized classes.242 Despite arguments to the contrary, such
a scheme would no more weaken the respect for private property
and the rule of law than does the bankruptcy code.2" Because
there cannot be restitution for all, a bankruptcy treatment
would be more easily accepted by successful claimants, because
all claimants would lose equally and no claimant would be left
without compensation; and by non-claimants and unsuccessful
claimants, who would bitterly oppose any restitution scheme
that left them out.2"
Compensation is, however, fundamentally unfair when
viewed from the perspective of nationals who did not receive
seized property. Even if the costs of compensation are spread
equally among exiles and nationals, those with property claims
and those without, compensation still unjustly enriches the
recipients of seized property. It has been argued that, in essence,
the benefits of socialized society that were received by all nation-
als - free education, health care, etc. - were the fruits of
seized property, and hence, the nationals have already been
compensated.2" Even so, the recipients of seized property re-
ceived the benefit of the seized property in addition to any bene-
fits of socialist society. Furthermore, many of the recipients of
seized property, which includes some of the most desirable prop-
240. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 151, at 250-51.
241. Id. at 251. Travieso-Diaz suggests that other forms of payment that might
be used include annuities, bonds, promissory notes, stock certificates in privatized
enterprises, and combinations of the above. Id.
242. Cueto, supra note 102, at 28-29.
243, Id. at 29. Arguably the moral hazard dilemma posed in an actual bank-
ruptcy scenario, wherein debtors assume greater risk than they otherwise would
absent bankruptcy protection, does not apply in the context of infrequent socialist
revolutions.
244. Id. at 31 n.68.
245. Id. at 33. Even though Cueto makes the point only rhetorically, the point
reflects a sentiment held by many in the exile community.
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erty in Cuba, received that property through their positions as
government officials or as rewards for serving the regime. It
seems quite unfair to usher in a new "democratic" system that
rewards the old guard by vesting them with clear property
rights and saddles everyone else with only the debt. The situa-
tion will undoubtedly become more complex if, as happened in
Nicaragua, the communist government, recognizing the end of
state socialism, privatizes state property by officially vesting
title in individual members of the nomenklatura.
Like restitution, compensation would ultimately be a com-
plex, time-consuming and expensive process. In fact, if the com-
pensation plan were predicated upon payment in cash or cash
equivalent out of general revenues, it would be "dangerous,"
considering the already exceedingly weak financial base of the
country."2 Given the current (1993) estimate of Cuban exile
claims of $20.02 billion, paying the full value of these claims
"diminishes the annual rate of recovery of the Cuban economy by
0.5% to 0. 7%."247 Furthermore, considering the paucity of as-
sets currently available, the cash compensation that any one
individual would receive is in all probability a very small
amount, perhaps as little as two-hundred dollars.24 Indeed, if
all of the effort is for as little as two-hundred dollars, perhaps it
is best to forego the whole compensation exercise.2 4' Therefore,
a future commitment to shares of privatized state firms or fu-
ture rights or preferences might be preferable.250 Arguably,
many Cuban-Americans have already been compensated for
their property losses in Cuba by the American government,
which allowed exiles meeting specific tests both business and
personal federal income tax deductions for property seized by
the Cuban government.251  In taking advantage of such
246. Castafteda & MontalvAn, supra note 16, at 15.
247. Alonso & Lago, supra note 146, at 16 (emphasis added). Note that this
figure does not include the claims of non-nationals who suffered property depriva-
tions.
248. Romafiach has calculated that the average compensation award would only
be two-hundred dollars, given the limited financial resources available for compensa-
tion. Romafach, supra note 73, at 97.
249. Cueto, supra note 102, at 32.
250. Castafieda & MontalvAn, supra note 16, at 15.
251. See I.R.C. § 161(c), (i) (1964). Deductions for both business losses, permitted
pursuant to general casualty and loss provisions of § 161(c)(1) and (2), and for per-
sonal losses, specifically permitted pursuant to § 161(c)(3) and (i), were allowed for
former Cuban citizens whose property was confiscated after they became U.S. resi-
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deductions, claimants arguably transferred their claims to the
U.S. government and all claims between such claimants and the
Cuban government should be considered extinguished.
It can also be argued that, after thirty-seven years of civil
and political liberty and material success in the United States
and other countries, the exiles have been adequately compensat-
ed, especially as seen in relief against the lack of liberty and in-
creasing economic deterioration experienced by the nationals. As
one national living in a seized home answered when told that
the former owner wanted his house back: "Tell... [him] that I
hope he wants his house back. He is welcome to it, if only he
will trade places with me." 2
F. Rejection of Classical Liberal Ownership
Allowing the occupant of each housing unit (who under the
Urban Reform Law possesses a very restricted notion of title
more akin to a right of occupancy)253 to acquire classical liberal
title through continued "amortization" payments to the state (or
the former owner), may prove to be a somewhat Pyrrhic victory
for the individual home owner and for society as a whole. In
post-socialist Romania, where no equivalent of the Urban Re-
form Law was ever implemented and the majority of dwelling
units were owned by the state, individual units were sold to
their occupants in order to provide classical liberal ownership
rights.2"' This type of sale was considered to be a great success
dent aliens. Id. at § 161(c)(1)-(3).
252. Dee Rivers, Whose Cuba is It?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 24, 1994.
253. See the discussion of title granted by the Urban Reform Law, supra notes
138-144 and accompanying text.
254. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 237, at 256-57. Decree-Law No. 6111990 Con-
cerning the Sale of State-Owned Housing (Romania) permitted tenants to purchase
their apartments or homes directly from the state. Id. Privately-built housing ac-
counted for 45.7% of new housing built in the 1951 to 1990 period in Romania. Id.
The program is further elaborated in Government Resolution No. 88/1991 Concerning
Measures for the Sale of State-Owned Housing and Government Resolution No.
56211991 Concerning Down-Payments and Installment Payments for the Sale of
State-Owned Housing. Id. Only housing in which there were no potential reprivatiza-
tion (restitution) claims was included in this program. Id. The demand of the pro-
gram was tremendous. Id. As Frydman reports, by May 31, 1992, two million apart-
ments had been sold to their tenants, with 2.3 million apartments still under state
control, for which already more than 600,000 applications had been submitted. Id.
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because of the number of units sold.2 5 However, the sale price
and interest rates offered had to be below market rates in order
to be politically feasible, resulting in a substantial loss of reve-
nue to the state.256 Furthermore, the new homeowners, who
alone became responsible for the condition of their housing, were
unable to improve their substandard housing due to a lack of fi-
nancial resources.257 Considering the alarmingly dilapidated
state of much of the former rental housing in Romania, "owner-
ship" might not have been in the best interest of many of these
former renters, who might have been quite happy to pay rent in
exchange for investment in their buildings.2 s
V. TOWARD A NEW FORM OF PROPERTY IN CUBA
A. The Spectrum of Successful Market Institutions Created
by Law
Property relations are frequently understood only within the
terms provided by the antipodal constructs of "passive" socialist
and "active" capitalist property relations, in which the state or
the propertied individual, respectively, has the effective right of
control and possession over property. Because the socialist con-
struct is currently discredited, it would seem that only the capi-
talist construct would hold validity for the transformation pro-
cess. Even so, the concept of a "market" economy is so broad as
to encompass systems as divergent as laissez faire American
capitalism and social democratic European capitalism, systems
in which the differences are at least as marked as the similari-
ties.25" Furthermore, within any of these variants of the mar-
ket system, a multiplicity of forms of successful hybrid property
255. Id.
256. Id. The Government Resolutions established a formula that determined the
sale price of a unit based on the cumulative rent paid and degree of depreciation of
the building. Id. Particularly where a high degree of depreciation was calculated,
sale prices were quite low. The sale could be financed by a twenty-five year mort-
gage with a required "down-payment" of ten percent, which could also be borrowed.
Id. The interest rate provided by the program was so low as to be negative, given
the high annual inflation rate, requiring continuing government subsidy of the pro-
gram. Id.
257. Id.
258. Cueto, supra note 102, at 21.
259. See Lester Thurow, Communitarian vs. Individualistic Capitalism, in TE
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, Fall 1992, at 24.
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arrangements have evolved. Many of these hybrid forms of prop-
erty relations, such as charitable trusts, partnerships, and coop-
eratives, continue to thrive, despite the fact that each arrange-
ment varies greatly from the classic notion of private property.
In fact, today passive pension funds are the primary holders of
the shares of corporations, a situation that has been criticized
for fostering contempt for shareholder prerogatives and which
turns the classical liberal notion of ownership upside down."
Indeed, ownership in the capitalist West is, in many respects, as
"passive" or "paternalistic" as was ownership in former socialist
countries.261
Furthermore, the economic organization of a given society
and the property regime it supports are hardly spontaneous
developments. The dominant form of twentieth century economic
organization in the United States, the modern corporation, came
into prominence not because, in a neutral framework of competi-
tion between competing institutional types, the corporate form
won in a process of natural selection.2"2 Rather, the modern
corporation in the United States was consciously created by
state legislatures and continually strengthened and validated by
the judiciary at numerous levels.2" Clearly the German Parlia-
ment and judiciary, in promulgating and validating the limited
liability company instead of the American-style corporation,
reached a different set of conclusions." 4 Property regimes are
the conscious product of policy decisions enacted through law.
Ultimately, the underlying dilemma faced in designing any
property regime is a question of policy: who should benefit? Who
should have the power of the state to enforce her property inter-
est at the expense of others? The question is therefore not a
question of law or economics that dictates a single path, but a
260. The dominant mode of capital ownership in the United States today, cor-
porate shareholding through institutions such as pension funds, creates a mode of
ownership that strongly reduces the degree of personal responsibility called for in
the liberal paradigm of property ownership. See Gregory S. Alexander, Pensioners in
America: The Economic Triumph and Political Limitations of Passive Ownership, in
A FOURTH WAY? PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW MARKET
ECONOMY 33, 33-34 (Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Skapska eds., 1994).
261. Id.
262. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 111-114 (1992).
263. Id.
264. Thurow, supra note 259, at 24.
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question of policy. What type of society does Cuba want to be-
come?
B. Goals of a Property Rights Regime in an Economy in
Transition
Because property regimes are created through conscious
policy choices, it is crucial that the new regime's desired goals be
clearly articulated and understood. This task must be given the
highest possible priority because once the new property regime
is established, vested interests will be spawned that will fight
tenaciously to retain their privileges.
Given the severe housing shortage in Cuba today and the
deplorable housing conditions that exist, it is crucial that any
new property regime provide increased incentives for investment
and foster higher housing standards. During the Revolution,
neither land nor capital were allocated in the most efficient
manner, creating gross inequilibrium between societal and indi-
vidual needs and resources that, due to the questionable accura-
cy of Revolutionary statistics, has never been adequately mea-
sured. It is therefore imperative that the new regime provide for
the mobilization of capital to fulfill unmet needs in the most effi-
cient manner as the dimensions of those needs become clear.
The new regime must also provide for the continued reallocation
of capital to its most efficient use. Furthermore, because the
previous regime made no accommodation for individual prefer-
ences in housing expenditure, the new regime must allow the
citizen to choose what proportion of his income to allocate to
housing. In order to reflect the dynamic character of housing
needs, the regime must also provide the citizen with flexibility
to alter her housing arrangements as new needs arise.
As the experiences of Eastern Europe have demonstrated,
the transformation from a planned economy to a market econo-
my requires not only the destruction of the communist state's
administrative apparatus, but, more importantly, the termina-
tion of the communist party's virtual monopoly over every sector
of society.2" Simultaneous with the technical goal of restruc-
265. Alexander M. Yakovlev, Transforming the Soviet Union into a Rule of Law
Democracy: A Report from the Front Lines, THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1991, at 129.
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turing property rights and relations to achieve greater economic
efficiency, the new property regime must, therefore, facilitate
the growth of new institutions to replace the discredited commu-
nist institutions. In Cuba, this task will perhaps be more diffi-
cult than in most other post-socialist societies, due to the more
marked unfamiliarity and fear associated with market mecha-
nisms and democratic processes and the concomitant increased
reliance on individual initiative required under a capitalist re-
gime. It is therefore essential that the new property regime
facilitate the growth of institutions that encourage active citizen
participation through mutually beneficial voluntary means that
simultaneously help develop individual autonomy. The new
property regime must help build universal respect for the rule of
law to the point that the new order of property becomes self-
enforcing. The state must make clear that it will no longer rely
on ad-hoc determinations.
C. Hybrid Proposals
In order to achieve the goals articulated above, as well as
other goals yet to emerge, the market economy as it already
exists in any given society cannot be slavishly imitated. New
institutions must be developed that disaggregate the bundle of
property rights and create new hybrid forms of property with an
eye to nurturing those goals. The legal scholar Gregory Alexan-
der identifies proposals for developing these new institutions,
characterized by active participation, democratic control, and
social inclusion, as representing a "fourth way."2 These pro-
posals reject simultaneously the "first way" of laissez faire capi-
talism, the "second way" of state socialism and the "third way"
of utopian market socialism.267
Such hybrid proposals often refer to the "social-republican"
vision, drawing on historical strains including Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon in France and Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson
in the United States.2" The social-republican vision seeks to
266. Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Skapska, Introduction: A Fourth Way?, in
A FOURTH WAY?: PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET
ECONOMIES xvi-xix (Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Skapska eds., 1994).
267. Id. at ix.
268. See William H. Simon, Republicanism, Market Socialism, and the Third
Way, in A FOURTH WAY?: PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW
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foster citizen participation in an enhanced community through
property arrangements that encourage the owner to take a long-
term view of her property interest."9 Social-republican proper-
ty relationships are characterized by restraints on alienation,
the limitation of membership in the community to active partici-
pants with a stake in the community, and restraints on accumu-
lation, limiting the inequality among members of the communi-
ty.27 A classic example of a social-republican property arrange-
ment is limited equity cooperative ownership, where typically
the cooperative authority will restrain both the right to
alienation and accumulation.27' The cooperative authority will
typically restrain alienation by requiring resale only through it
or by retaining a right of first refusal, limiting purchasers to
persons who occupy the unit as a primary residence and fall
within certain income criteria.272 The cooperative authority will
typically restrain accumulation by requiring that gains from the
resale of the unit accrue to the cooperative authority.2 7 3 Such a
restraint will often limit the unit owner's share to his initial
investment and capital improvements and thereby reap all sur-
plus value gains for the collective.274
Social-republican arrangements are criticized as fostering
both inefficiency and exclusiveness. 75 Due to the fact that so-
cial-republican arrangements are by definition characterized by
the incomplete commodification and intentional illiquidity of the
property relationship, certain inefficiencies are created.276
However, by making exit more difficult or costly, the arrange-
ments arguably induce greater individual investment by reduc-
ing the risk of subsequent opportunistic withdrawal by other
parties.277 Social-republican arrangements are criticized for fos-
tering exclusiveness due to the fact that admitting new members
on equal terms with founding members would be a direct and
MARKET ECONOMIES 286-87 (Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Skapska eds., 1994).
269. Simon describes the social-republican model of property as a middle path
between capitalist and socialist concepts of property. Id. at 287.
270. Id. at 287-88.
271. Id. at 289-94.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
499
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
uncompensated transfer of built-up wealth from founding to new
members.278 There exists in such arrangements a strong incen-
tive to limit membership or, given the necessary broad discretion
to manage their affairs, selectively admit into the community in
a manner that produces social or economic homogeneity, possibly
as a result of invidious discrimination.279 Given the potential
class and racial conflict inherent in the Cuban situation, the
problem of exclusivity cannot be easily overlooked. The exclu-
sivity dilemma is not easily resolved.280 Exercising governmen-
tal control to the degree required to insure equal entry, through
a random lottery process, forced admission, or the subsidized
entry of individuals or the formation of new social-republican
institutions, would so dilute the self-reinforcing glue of social-
republican claims that they would simply wither away.28" ' Just
as it is clear that the body politic can aid in developing commu-
nity (even if the body politic cannot itself create community
where there is none), it is equally clear that the body politic can
easily destroy a fragile community where it has blossomed. The
key to formulating property arrangements must be to provide in-
centives such that each autonomous community, allowed to
operate through its own style and processes of decision making,
favors diversity over exclusivity.
D. Additional Considerations Regarding a New Property
Regime
As no market exists in an economy in transition, a new
property regime must be established without the benefit of prop-
er valuation. Because the values of state-held property are not
known, it is impossible to equitably allocate the properties.
Therefore, a poorly conceived property regime that does not
account for the fact that properties have different values, even if
those values are not as yet reflected in the market, may further
exacerbate income inequalities.
Any new property regime runs the risk of unfairly allocating
societal benefits, particularly to the nomenklatura. Simply
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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granting the title to each unit to the occupant of that unit would
disproportionately benefit individuals already living in desirable
neighborhoods or buildings. Therefore, the Housing Ministry
must take steps to alleviate the difference between neighbor-
hoods by using a portion of the proceeds of privatization to pro-
vide amenities, such as parks, playgrounds and schools in less
desirable neighborhoods.
Once market mechanisms begin to function, there will be a
strong, if not inescapable, impetus for housing preferences, supp-
ressed for so long, to take on a renewed vigor, resulting in a
select few areas becoming gentrified and numerous other areas
devolving into slums. The new property regime must aim to
minimize the cycles of gentrification and decay. On the other
hand, the regime must recognize that because much of the hous-
ing is deteriorated, it is only logical that the expression of hous-
ing preferences would result in a rejection of substandard hous-
ing by those who can afford to do so. The Housing Ministry
should adopt a housing rehabilitation scheme that targets re-
sources at improving substandard housing, while allowing for
the demolition of substandard housing that cannot be rehabili-
tated.
VI. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW FORM OF PROPERTY
A. Overview
The Limited Equity Housing Corporation (LEHC) scheme
provides no actual restitution of property to former property
owners. A limited form of compensation is provided, however, in
a manner that encourages investment and participation in the
reconstruction of Cuba by former owners. The LEHC scheme
recognizes that Cuba is an impoverished country in which the
need for investment in the housing sector is immense, due to the
housing shortage and because at least half of all housing units
will need to be replaced because they are of substandard con-
struction or were built on land that is more suitable for other
purposes. The scheme also recognizes that the Cuban nationals
paid the greatest cost during the Castro regime. A scheme that
favored the simplistic restoration of property rights would result
in the questionable massive redistribution of property,
reinstituting an anachronistic structure of income and wealth
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distribution that is generally agreed to be undesirable and was
at some level the ultimate cause of the socialist revolution. Such
a redistribution would undoubtedly exacerbate anticipated ten-
sions between exiles and nationals and lead to widespread social
unrest. Furthermore, any restitution scheme would result in
administrative difficulty and delay that would cloud property
rights for years and discourage productive foreign investment.
Therefore, compensation bonds will be given to claimants in lieu
of restitution for use in either passive or active investment in
housing in a manner that allows claimants to recoup their com-
pensation at a faster rate than non-claimants.
B. Property Registration Scheme
The first task of the Housing Ministry will be the registra-
tion of all occupants of residential property in order to establish
the ownership of each dwelling unit and other legal rights. The
land underlying any housing will continue to belong to the state.
No one who occupies a unit after the established registration
period will be entitled to participate in the housing
marketization program. Records established by the Urban Re-
form Committees282 will be used to prepare a tentative list of
property occupiers. However, because the official housing regis-
ters of the Urban Reform Committees do not reflect illegal leas-
ing or sub-leasing, self-help housing or other informal arrange-
ments, they cannot be relied on exclusively.
The Housing Ministry will assign each unit a contingent
"value" based on ranked valuables, including location, architec-
tural significance, condition of building, unit size and amenities
assigned to the housing group to which the unit belongs, such as
parking structures or playgrounds. An assignment of 100 will
establish a unit as the "average" unit.
C. Formation of a Limited Equity Housing Corporation
The Housing Ministry will aggregate individual dwelling
units into housing groups, the building block for the housing
282. See discussion of the Urban Reform Committees, supra notes 101-103 and
accompanying text.
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marketization scheme. Each housing group will consist of ap-
proximately twenty to one hundred similar units, the land un-
derlying the units and the minimum amount of ancillary land
that is integral to the housing group. Amenities such as parking
structures and playgrounds, as well as unbuilt park or other
unbuilt land, will be included in the housing group only where
necessary to form a cohesive whole. Once established as a hous-
ing group, the occupants will have the option to enter the
government's housing marketization scheme as a LEHC, as
determined in an election where each unit is given one vote. The
primary benefit to the housing group of entering into the pro-
gram will be to obtain free and clear title to the underlying land
and ancillary amenities. Additional benefits will include speci-
fied tax incentives to form housing corporations, which will spe-
cifically target profits reinvested in severely deteriorated hous-
ing stock for a tax holiday of five years.
In order to minimize the concentration of power in the
Housing Ministry and the associated bureaucratic procedure,
costs, and actors involved, housing groups will be allowed to
"self-privatize" through a type of regulated spontaneous privat-
ization. In order to self-privatize, a prospective housing group
must hire a private, independent property evaluation consultant
registered with the Housing Ministry.' The consultant will
evaluate the financial position and potential of the property,
guiding the housing group through the transformation process,
including the auction or negotiations process and chartering of a
LEHC, following established guidelines. The Housing Ministry
will be required to accept the results of the self-privatization,
absent a showing of violation of established guidelines. Allowing
housing groups to self-privatize will not only reduce delays, it
will create greater demand and expertise in the private sector
283. In 1991, Hungary established a "self-privatization" scheme for small busi-
ness enterprises. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 237, at 135-36. In the Hungarian
scheme, a state-owned enterprise could initiate and complete the privatization pro-
cess by employing an independent property evaluation consultant from a state-ap-
proved list in lieu of going through the established privatization process with the
State Property Agency. Id. The consultant's fee was a percentage of the sale pro-
ceeds. Id. The State Property Agency was required to accept the outcome of these
contracts, unless a violation of stated legal regulations could be shown. Id. Consul-
tants wishing to perform such services were required to prove prior experience in
asset evaluation and have a specified minimum capitalization. Id. The first stage of
this process, involving some 400 small enterprises, was successful enough that a
second stage was planned. Id. See also Miszei et al., supra note 21, at 57-60.
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for sophisticated property services and immediately introduce
market mechanisms.
D. Capital and Voting Structure
There will be two classes of shares in a LEHC, occupant
shares and investor shares, as well as compensation bonds. Only
occupant and investor shares will have voting rights. Sixty-seven
percent of the voting shares will be occupant shares and thirty-
three percent of the shares will be investor shares. Once the
LEHC has been established, the Housing Ministry will publish a
list of LEHCs and commence a staggered auction of investor
shares in the properties.
One hundred occupant shares will be allocated to each unit.
Each 100 occupant shares will grant the occupant the perpetual
right to occupy a particular unit. After the initial waiting period
is over, occupant shares can be alienated with the approval of a
majority of voting shares. When selling the unit, the occupant
will receive forty percent of the surplus value of the unit. Occu-
pant shares can be left to heirs without prior approval of any
kind. Disaggregating the shares can be accomplished only with
approval of a super-majority of all voting shares. Occupants will
be free to make improvements in their units, requiring approval
only where major structural work is involved or where the exte-
rior appearance of the housing group will be negatively impact-
ed.
Investor shares will grant the bearer a proportional interest
in all property held by the housing corporation in common, in-
cluding all appurtenant land, amenities, and commercial spaces.
This interest will include the right to a stream of revenues from
the rent of commercial spaces and a share in the resale of units.
There will be no restraints on the alienation of investor shares.
Investor shares can be purchased at a twenty-five percent dis-
count using compensation bonds. After the waiting period is
over, investors will be free to buy out individual occupants of
their occupant shares. The day-to-day operation of the facility
will be delegated to the owners of investor shares, who may
choose to hire an outside management service.
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Former owners will be compensated with compensation
bonds.' The number of compensation bonds granted to each
citizen will be determined by the Claims Commission. Compen-
sation bonds will grant the bearer a revenue stream based on
total profits and the sale of units of the housing corporation.
Compensation bonds can be used to purchase investor shares in
the following manner: the person holding the compensation
bonds will bid for a housing group through the established pro-
cedure; the actual purchase price paid by the bearer will be
twenty-five percent less than the winning bid; the bearer will
then exchange her compensation bonds for investor shares on a
one for one basis. Compensation bonds that are not converted to
investor shares will draw ten percent of the net profits of the
housing corporation for thirty years, at which point the bonds
will mature without any additional payment.
A super-majority (67%) of shareholders must approve all
non-ordinary activities of the housing corporation, such as major
building improvements, any reduction or increase in the number
of units, any increase in building charges greater than five per-
cent in a one year period and any capital expenditures over a
pre-determined amount. A super-majority will be required in
order to insure that investors can act only with the approval of a
majority of the occupants. For instance, investors will not be
able to gentrify the building by extortionately raising building
charges and forcing poorer occupants out.
E. Moderate Restraints on Alienation
No sales of units will be allowed within two years of the
establishment of a LEHC in order to prevent occupants from
selling their interests too cheaply and then becoming a societal
burden. This moderate restraint will permit each interest group
to better understand how it can realize its own needs and inter-
ests vis-h-vis the interests of other parties. The waiting period
will enable a nascent market to emerge, allowing investors and
developers a chance to evaluate and rank properties, while si-
multaneously allowing occupants to develop familiarity with the
284. In addition, occupants registered as living in units with less than "average"
value will be compensated with the proportion of compensation bonds necessary to
bring their compensation level up to average.
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operation of market mechanisms and to assess their own hous-
ing needs. Likewise, occupants will have the opportunity
through media campaigns conducted by the Housing Ministry to
become cognizant of the fact that the reduced social welfare net
of the state will not be able to provide alternative housing
should the occupant sell her unit, while simultaneously allowing
the state to begin development of a realistic social safety net,
including the implementation of a system of emergency short-
term housing. During the entire waiting period, speculators and
developers will be permitted to negotiate with housing corpo-
rations and individuals concerning selling particular units, or
even entire complexes. However, any contract entered into be-
fore the waiting period is over will be considered unenforceable,
with possible criminal sanctions.
The corporation will have the right to approve the sale of all
unit shares. If the corporation does not approve the sale, it must
purchase the shares at the bona fide third party offer price. This
mechanism will prevent occupants from cheating the corporation
and the Housing Ministry by selling their units to third parties
at reduced rates in exchange for cash under the table, so-called
"key money." The mechanism will also prevent the corporation
from unduly interfering with the unit owner's right to alienate
his property interest: if the corporation considers the reason not
to sell to be compelling, it must be able to come up with the
money. The abuse of this mechanism must be limited by the
strict enforcement of laws aimed at preventing invidious dis-
crimination. A statement of the anti-discrimination policy should
appear prominently on all sales contracts and be featured promi-
nently in all media campaigns initiated by the Housing Minis-
try.
The housing corporation, the occupant, the Housing Minis-
try and bondholders will share in the capture of the surplus
value generated by sales and rentals. Upon the sale of a unit,
the surplus value will be distributed as follows: 40% to the occu-
pant, 40% to the housing corporation, 10% to the Housing Minis-
try to help underwrite additional housing initiatives, including
the construction of new housing, and 10% as payment toward
compensation bonds. Allowing the corporation to capture a full
40% of surplus value will encourage the corporation to make
additional capital improvements. Since the corporation is direct-
ly compensated on a dollar for dollar basis for capital improve-
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ments as they are built, the scheme will encourage the LEHC to
make investments that add value to the corporation. Further-
more, allowing the corporation to profit from the sale of units by
occupants will encourage the corporation to be vigilant in moni-
toring the sale of units and thereby help discourage the forma-
tion of a gray market. Allowing the occupant to capture 40% of
the surplus value will give the occupant the opportunity to sell
and repurchase in order to obtain the optimal housing expen-
diture for her household. In addition to the 10% of the proceeds
from the sale of a unit that will be paid to compensation bond-
holders, 10% of the net profits generated by the housing corpora-
tion by other activities, such as the rental of commercial space,
will also be paid to such bondholders.
Occupants will be permitted to rent their units for a period
of not more than two years. When the unit is rented, the surplus
value of the rent is shared: with 40% retained by the occupant,
40% assigned to the corporation, 10% to the housing ministry,
and 10% to the compensation bondholders.
VII. CONCLUSION
The marketization of housing in Cuba will be possible only
within the framework of a privatization scheme that takes into
account the realities of contemporary Cuba, including the pover-
ty of the island and the tension between the exile community
and Cuban nationals. A successful transformation will not be
spontaneous: new institutions must be crafted that help bridge
the gap between the two communities by emphasizing joint
reconstruction and strengthening the rule of law, while promot-
ing economic efficiency and the proper allocation of societal as-
sets. The Limited Equity Housing Corporation is a prototype for
transformation that should be tested in post-socialist Cuba and
adjusted to reflect the changing circumstances of the transfor-
mation as it develops.
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